Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

1999

Taking the "I" Out of "Team": Intra-Firm Monitoring and the Content
of Fiduciary Duties
Eric L. Talley
Columbia Law School, etalley@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Eric L. Talley, Taking the "I" Out of "Team": Intra-Firm Monitoring and the Content of Fiduciary Duties, 24 J.
CORP. L. 1001 (1999).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1180

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu, rwitt@law.columbia.edu.

Taking the "I" out of "Team": Intra-Firm Monitoring and
the Content of Fiduciary Duties

Eric Talley*
I. INTRO DUCTION ....................................................................................................... 100 1

II. THE L EGAL M ILIEU ................................................................................................. 1005

III.

MONITORING, DETERRENCE, AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES: AN EXAMPLE ...................

A . Framew ork .......................................................................................................
B . Closely-Held Structure .....................................................................................
1. Region 1: "Weak" FiduciaryDuties...........................................................
2. Region 2: "Moderate"FiduciaryDuties ....................................................
3. Region 3: "Strong" FiduciaryDuties .........................................................
C. W idely-Held Structure......................................................................................
D. Variations,Limitations, and Caveats...............................................................
1. Verifiable Investm ents .................................................................................
2. P revention ...................................................................................................
3. Severe Free Riding ......................................................................................
4. Deep Pockets ............................................
5. Non-Team Beneficiaries..............................................................................
6. Multiple Equilibria......................................................................................
7. Rep eat Play .................................................................................................

1011
10 12
1015
1017
1020
1021
1022
1024
1024
1025
1026
1026
1027
1028
1029

IV . LEGAL IM PLICATIONS ............................................................................................. 1033
A . Statutory Law....................................................................................................
1033
B. Doctrine............................................................................................................
1035
V . CONCLUDING REM ARKS ......................................................................................... 1037
I. INTRODUCTION

Depending on whom one asks, the last decades' proliferation of statutory business
structures is a cause for either celebration or concern. Some laud this recent trend,
arguing that a highly permutated menu of tax treatments, liability limitations, and
governance hierarchies facilitates the alignment of legal status with organizational need.
Others view statutory variety more skeptically, warning that it may simply portend
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Rock and Lynn Stout for helpful discussions; and to Yonit Hassid for excellent research assistance. All errors
are mine.
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1
greater cost externalization, strategic behavior, and distributional inequity. But one set
of legal doctrines has persisted throughout: the concept of fiduciary duty. Indeed,
fiduciary obligations remain fundamental to the legal governance structure of virtually
every statutory business entity.
That said, the precise normative relationship between fiduciary standards and
organizational form remains highly contested. A number of courts and commentators
maintain that fiduciaries of "closely-held" firms (e.g., close corporations and
partnerships) should be subject to substantially more onerous fiduciary obligations than
2
their counterparts in public corporations. Lacking the convenient exit options and the
external discipline provided by well-developed securities markets, the argument goes,
owners of closely-held firms must rely exclusively (or nearly so) on fiduciary duties to
check managerial opportunism. Critics have challenged this view, pointing out that the
larger ownership stake typically possessed by fiduciaries of closely-held firms requires3
decisions.
them to bear a substantial share of the costs from their own managerial
Moreover, such firms frequently comprise participants with long-standing (and even
familial) relationships-a source of repeat interaction that facilitates the formation of
4
extra-legal behavioral norms to stem managerial misfeasance. Consequently, these
critics contend, the categorical case for strict legal duties within closely-held structures is
far from compelling.
In the pages below, I endeavor to revisit this governance debate, albeit through a
slightly different lens: the "team-production" theory of the firm. In its most basic form,
the team-production account spotlights the observation that productive activities within
many economic organizations require coordinated, firm-specific investments from two or
more participants. (Stronger forms of this account posit that team structures are pervasive
within 5commercial activity, and are in fact the defining characteristic of all multi-person
firms). Although the team-production model is enjoying renewed popularity within
6
numerous industrial and academic realms, it poses particular challenges for
produced by a team is frequently
output
organizational governance issues. Indeed, the
attempts to deduce ex post the
frustrates
non-separable in nature, a characteristic that

1. For an overview of this debate, see infra Part II.
2. See, e.g., PAUL MAHONEY, TRUST AND OPPORTUNISM IN CLOSE CORPORATIONS (National Bureau of
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6919, 1998) (arguing, using a game-theoretic model with complete
information, that easy exit options can induce majority shareholders to exercise restraint in behaving
opportunistically); J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed
Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close CorporationProblem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1 (1977) (using this argument
to propose a put option for minority shareholders in closely-held corporations, which would, if exercised, force
majority shareholders to buy them out at a specified strike price); Margaret Blair & Lynn Stout, A Team
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247 (1999), reprinted in 24 J. CORP. L. 751 (1999);
Robert Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause ofAction for Oppression, 48 BUS. LAW. 699 (1993).
3. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporationsand Agency Costs, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 271 (1986); Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr., Filling Gaps in the Close Corporation Contract: A Transaction
Cost Analysis, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 216 (1992).
4.

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW

229, 243-44 (1991).
5. Blair & Stout, supranote 2.
6. See, e.g., CHARLES C. MANz & HENRY P. SIMS JR., BUSINESS WITHOUT BOSSES (1993); Yeon-Koo
Che and Seung-Weon Yoo, Optimal Incentives in Teams (November 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) (detailing this popularity).
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contributions of individual team members. 7 In turn, this form of non-contractibility can
exacerbate problems of strategic behavior, reducing the overall productive capacity of the
team. 8 But within this quagmire of opportunism lies a potentially important role for law.
Appropriately-crafted default legal rules can mollify team-production dilemmas by reshaping the incentive structure faced by team members to enhance the well-being and
productivity of the firm's participants.
So animated, a team-production approach can inject helpful new insights into the
existing debate over the relationship between organizational structure and fiduciary
obligation. This Article explores one such insight. Explicitly, I argue that imposing
enhanced fiduciary duties on closely-held firms may actually be counter-productive once
one accounts for the strategic effects that enhanced duties can have on the members of a
productive team. In fact, I shall argue, these strategic effects can be sufficiently grave to
undermine the aggregate productivity of the team, thereby justifying fiduciary duties in at
least some closely-held firms that are weaker than those that govern widely-held
organizations.
The core of my argument is as follows. If one supposes that a principal purpose of
fiduciary law is to deter intra-furm opportunism, 9 then the substantive content of legal
duties should, as a normative matter, be sensitive to the composition and incentives of the
productive "team" in question. In closely-held fums, participants generally find
themselves wearing dual hats. Those who engage in productive activities are quite often
the same individuals who are its residual claimants, and are thus the presumptive
enforcers of one another's fiduciary obligations.' 0 Within such a context, an enhanced
fiduciary duty engenders two competing strategic effects. The first stems from the
fiduciary's increased fear of being "caught" engaging in misfeasance, inducing her to
refrain from opportunism. But a second, competing effect also emerges. Enhanced
fiduciary obligations increase one's expected returns from successfully detecting a fellow
team member's transgressions. This latter effect can give team members an affirmative
incentive to step up their efforts at monitoring, leaving them less time to engage in
productive activities. In what follows, I shall refer to these two competing effects,
respectively, as the deterrence effect and the monitoring effect. Significantly, which of
these two effects dominates is indeterminate on a priori grounds. Consequently, in
evaluating whether enhanced fiduciary duties should govern closely-held firms, one must
7. For similar descriptions, see Blair & Stout, supra note 2, at 249-50, reprintet. in 24 J. CORP. L. 751,

752-53 (1999). See generally SUSAN ALBERS MOHRMAN ET AL., DESIGNING TEAM-BASED ORGANIZATIONS

(1995).
8. Though opportunistic behavior by team members is my principal focus, others have highlighted
additional problems within teams, such as rent seeking and collusion among the individual team members. See
Jean J. Laffont & David Martimort, Collusion UnderAsymmetric Information, 66 ECONOMETRICA 875 (1997).
9. Both contractarian and non-contractarian corporations scholars appear to agree that fiduciary duties
serve this fundamental role. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 91-93; David Millon,
Communitarianismin CorporateLaw: Foundations of Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE
LAW 1, 14 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
10. In fact, in some industries, such as law practice, members of a team are required to be the sole residual
claimants on the enterprise. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (1992); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 3-102(A), 3-103(A), and 5-107(C) (amended 1980). For a critique of these
(and other) ethical guidelines as obstacles to reputation-building, see Larry Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency
Costs, andLaw Firm Structure,84 VA. L. REV. 1707 (1998).
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first inquire whether the consequent deterrence effects are likely to outweigh the
monitoring effects. Should this tradeoff cut in the other direction, then not only might a
strict fiduciary standard be inadvisable, but it may even be optimal to dilute-perhaps
such organizations."I
significantly-the relative bite of fiduciary duties within
Widely-held firms (such as public corporations), in contrast, generally do not--or at
least need not-manifest the strategic tension described above. Indeed, the principal
beneficiaries of fiduciary duties in widely-held firms are by definition not managers, but
12
rather third-parties (such as shareholders ) who are generally not members of the
productive team. As such, it is the shareholders (or more often their elected
representatives on the board of directors) who possess the greatest incentives to monitor
managerial opportunism. Managers meanwhile, largely dispossessed of the financial
incentives to monitor, experience solely the deterrence effect upon an enhancement of
13
dominates therefore
their fiduciary obligations. The issue of which strategic effect
14
firm.
widely-held
the
within
role
plays a relatively insignificant
15
This insight, which has been largely neglected in the corporations literature, poses
interesting consequences from both statutory and doctrinal perspectives. Indeed, my
in
11. The intuition behind this argument bears tangential resemblance to the "multitasking" literature
to solve moral
economics, which posits that high-powered incentive contracts may be an undesirable way
and only a
hazard problems, particularly when an agent divides her time between multiple productive activities
to critique the
subset of those activities yields a verifiable output. Such arguments have been used, for example,
would rationally
use of merit pay for teachers based on students' standardized test scores, for fear that teachers
testable skills
more
into
and
appreciation),
poetry
as
(such
skills
difficult-to-test
covering
from
away
substitute
AM. ECON.
84
System,
Incentive
an
as
Firm
The
(such as algebra). See Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom,
REV. 972 (1994); Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multi-project Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive
Contracts,Asset Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 524 (1991).
and
12. One might, of course, posit that the "shareholder primacy" view of fiduciary duties is indefensible,
e.g..
See,
consistencies.
non-managerial
other
include
should
that the legitimate beneficiaries of fiduciary duties
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (allowing directors to take into account the
in this
impact of a tender offer on non-shareholder constituencies in formulating defensive strategies). Nothing
article turns on a shareholder-primacy view, however. In fact, in what follows, I adopt a joint-welfare measure
beneficiaries of
in defining an "optimal" level of fiduciary duties. What is critical, however, is that the principal
fiduciary duties in widely-held firms be distinct from the members of the productive team.
13. It is, of course, possible for publicly-held firms to structure the compensation packages of corporate
many
managers in a way that encourages mutual monitoring. At the same time, however, doing so is but one of
exist.
not
does
option
the
firm,
options for a publicly-held firm. In a closely-held
14. There may be other strategic issues relevant to intra-firm policing. For example, a potential defendant
might be inclined to expend wasteful effort on defensive (or "paper-shredding") activities so as to reduce the
possibility of a successful suit. I do not touch on such effects in this article, however, on the theory that they
would be equally applicable in both closely- and widely-held firms.
15. See, e.g., Claire Moore Dickerson, Is It Appropriate to Appropriate Corporate Concepts: Fiduciary
Duties and the Revised Uniform PartnershipAct, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 111, 116 (1993) (arguing that fiduciary
duties "serve to guide the parties to a standard of behavior that reduces the need to monitor," but generally
omitting considerations of the incentive to monitor (emphasis added)); Larry Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary
rule is
Duties in Close Corporations,138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1991 (1990) (arguing that the business judgment
omitting
also
but
monitoring,
intra-firm
of
ease
relative
the
of
unnecessary in close corporations because
considerations of incentives to monitor). In some ways, the widely-held firm accomplishes many of the same
effects as does "decoupling" compensatory from punitive damages. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che,
(arguing
Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentivesfor Care and Litigation, 22 RAND J. ECON. 562, 563 (1991)
goals
deterrence
optimal
of
pursuit
the
facilitate
may
damages
that decoupling compensatory from punitive
the
without encouraging excessive amounts of litigation). Much of the early literature on team production notes
monitoring
of
effects
adverse
potentially
the
neglects
but
firms,
moral hazard problems in closely-held
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analysis suggests that the participants in some closely-held firms (i.e., those dominated by
deterrence effects) are well-served by a strict fiduciary governance structure, while others
(i.e., those dominated by monitoring effects) are better served by relaxed standards. 16
From a statutory perspective, this observation provides a rationale for maintaining
heterogeneity among business organization statutes, thereby affording firms the
advantages of regulatory self-selection. But absent such statutory heterogeneity, my
argument suggests that courts would be well-advised to take intra-firm monitoring
incentives into account when prescribing the applicable quantum of fiduciary obligation
17
in a given case.
The remainder of this Article contains four parts. Part II briefly describes the
existing legal and institutional milieu that surrounds the relationship between fiduciary
duties and organizational structure, exposing the rough contours of the debate that
continues to engulf the case law and the business governance literature. Part III, which
represents the core of the Article, analyzes a simple game-theoretic example of team
production. Using this example, I demonstrate how an enhanced fiduciary duty within
closely-held firms can (though need not always) detract from a team's overall
productivity, and I explain why this concern is largely absent within widely-held
organizations. This part concludes by exploring the robustness of the example in light of
seven plausible variations on its assumptions. 18 Part IV gives some preliminary thoughts
on the legal implications of this analysis, exploring how statutory authority and/or
doctrine might best accommodate my principal thesis. Finally, Part V presents
concluding remarks.
II. THE LEGAL MILIEU

Before plunging into specifics, it is perhaps prudent to situate my argument within
the larger legal debate over the relationship between fiduciary obligation and ownership
structure. This Part attempts to do so by concentrating on three central observations. First,
while fiduciary duties transcend all business organization forms, the application of such
duties has been neither uniform nor consistent. Second, this lack of uniformity has
spawned both judicial and academic debates about whether and how organizational form
should affect the content of fiduciary obligations. Finally, the participants in this debate
have ended up largely at analytical loggerheads-one that a team-production approach
may help to inform.
It is perhaps most appropriate to begin an account of the evolution of fiduciary
obligations within partnerships. Indeed, partnership law (unlike its younger statutory
cousins) is an artifact of the common law, albeit one that is now largely codified in every
state. Moreover, it was here where Benjamin Cardozo left his now-infamous doctrinal

incentives. See, e.g., Arleen Leibowitz & Robert Tollison, FreeRiding, Shirking and Team Production in Legal
Partnerships, 18 ECON. INQUIRY 380, 383 (1980); Fred S. McChesney, Team Production, Monitoring and
Profit-Sharing in Law Firms: An Alternative Hypothesis, II J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (1982) (concentrating on
billing patterns and compensation).
16. See infra Part 111.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. These variations consider the effects of (1) verifiable inputs; (2) prevention; (3) severe free riding; (4)
deep pockets; (5) non-team beneficiaries; (6) coordination failures; and (7) repeat play. See infra Part Il1.

The Journalof CorporationLaw

1006

[Summer

19
epitaph, in Meinhard v. Salmon, likening a fiduciary to a trustee, and imposing a duty
that required "uncompromising rigidity" and the "punctilio of an honor the most
20
like that of
sensitive" as the standard for fiduciary comportment. Cardozo's approach,
21
of
conceived
him,
followed
and
preceded
both
who
theorists
and
numerous judges
an
justified
that
precepts
moral
fundamental
from
originating
as
fiduciary obligations
immutable check on market behavior-a view largely inherited from the English
22
ecclesiastical and equity courts. As this doctrinal view evolved over time, courts began
routinely to hold that a partner's fiduciary duty extended not only to the partnership
23
entity, but also to each partner individually. Some legal scholars have since attempted
to augment this approach with economic justifications, asserting that strict standards of
necessary to induce participants to enter into an arrangement of power
comportment are 24
vulnerability.
and
Be that as it may, recent years have produced both doctrinal and statutory
innovations that have chipped away at this ancestral mantle of uncompromising honor.
25
The Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA), now statutory authority in twenty-one
26
states (and counting), has contributed significantly to this trend. The RUPA expressly

19. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). Formally, Meinhard involved a "joint venture" rather than a "general
partnership." However, most jurisdictions have long viewed joint ventures as little more than a species of
above
partnership organized for a specified transaction (or series thereof), and have accordingly expanded the
ON
reasoning more generally to cover partnerships writ large. See generally SCOTT ROWLEY, 2 ROWLEY
PARTNERSHIP §§ 52.1-52.62 (2d ed. 1960).
20. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546.
21. E.g., I AUSTIN SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 38-39 (2d ed. 1956).
22. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, FiduciaryLaw, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 830 (1983).
23. See, e.g., Allan W. Vestal, FundamentalContractarianErrorin the Revised Uniform PartnershipAct
a
of 1992, 73 B.U. L. REV. 523, 524-27 (1993) (describing the fiduciary obligations of partners inter se). In
that
arguing
obligations,
fiduciary
partnership
of
history
popularized
the
questions
Ribstein
Larry
recent article,
"waivers" of fiduciary duty have always been enforced by courts. Larry Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts in
UnincorporatedFirms, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 537, 570-85 (1997). The merits of this claim ultimately
depend on one's jurisprudential interpretation; but even if it is true, it says little about the historical content of
fiduciary duties as a default matter. Moreover, because fiduciary duties are probably the most difficult to
provide for with express contract terms, the content of default rules can often be extremely important. See infra
text accompanying notes 125-135.
24. E.g.. Frankel, supra note 22, at 830.
25. REvISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT (1996).
26. These states are: Alabama, ALA. CODE §§ 10-8A-101 to 10-8A-1109 (Supp. 1998); Arizona, ARIZ.
Supp.
REv. STAT. §§ 29-1001 to 29-1111 (1998); California, CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 16100 to 16962 (West
1999); Colorado, COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-64-101 to 7-64-1206 (West 1998); Connecticut, CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 34-300 to 34-434 (1999); Florida, FLA. STAT. ch. 620.81001 to 620.91 (1997 & Supp. 1998); Idaho,
IDAHO CODE §§ 53-3-101 to 53-3-1205 (1998); Iowa, IOWA CODE §§ 486A.101 to 486A.1302 (1999);
Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., CORPS & ASS'NS. §§ 9A-101 to 9A-1205 (Supp. 1998); Minnesota, MINN. STAT.
§§ 323A.1-01 to 323A.12-03 (Supp. 1997); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-10-101 to 35-10-644 (1997);
Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT.

§§

67-401 to 67-467 (Supp. 1998); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN.

§§

54-lA-101

to 54-IA-1007 (Michie Supp. 1998); North Dakota, N.D. CENT CODE §§ 45-13-01 to 45-21-08 (Supp. 1999);
Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 54, §§ 1-100 to 1-1207 (Supp. 1998); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 67.005 to 67.810
(1997); Texas, TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b-1.01 to 6132b-10.04 (West 1970 & Supp. 1998);
to
Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 3201 to 3313 (Supp. 1998); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-73.79

50-73.149 (Michie Supp. 1998); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE §§ 47B-1-1 to 47B-11-5 (1998); and Wyoming,
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-21-101 to 17-21-1003 (Michie 1999). In addition to these states, both the District of
Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 41-151.1 to 41-162.3 (1998) and the U.S. Virgin Islands, V.I. CODE ANN. tit.
26, §§ I to 274 (Supp. 1999), have adopted the RUPA.

1999]

Taking the "I" out of "Team"

1007

confines a partner's duty of loyalty to three particularized manifestations: (1) accounting
for profits derived from partnership business; (2) refraining from dealing with the
partnership as an adverse party without consent; and (3) refraining from competing with
the partnership before dissolution.27 Moreover, it makes clear that a partner is not the
functional equivalent of a trustee, and consequently she does not necessarily run afoul of
her fiduciary duties simply by engaging in actions that create a private benefit. 28 Third,
the RUPA explicitly imports a weaker contractual standard of "good faith and fair
dealing" by which to judge a partner's discharge of her fiduciary duties (although it then
proceeds to muddy the waters considerably by shrouding this obligation in more
traditional fiduciary garb 29). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the RUPA partially
relaxes the immutability of fiduciary duties, recognizing a limited power of
the
partnership agreement to prescribe standards for measuring compliance with fiduciary
duties in particular activities. 30 This trend is reflected in recent case law. For example, it
is now quite unremarkable for courts to accord substantial teleological deference to
controlling factions within a partnership who invoke a provision in a partnership
agreement to expel one of their counterparts. 3 1
At the same time, however, this gradual relaxation of traditional fiduciary duties
within partnerships has not gone unqualified. One can still to this day find numerous
examples in which modem courts appear to hearken back (at least rhetorically) to the
strict standards enunciated in Meinhard.32 Furthermore, the RUPA also recognizes a
fiduciary duty of care-a concept that was absent within the old Uniform Partnership
Act-which proscribes the grossly negligent, reckless, or intentional misconduct of a
partner. 33 The Act also prohibits partnership agreements from either waiving fiduciary
duties writ large, or attempting to soften fiduciary duties in a way deemed to be
manifestly unreasonable 34-a constraint that is somewhat more onerous than that

27.

REvISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404(b)(1)-(3).
28. REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404(e) and cmt. 5.
29. REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404(d) and cmt. 5. See also Larry Ribstein,
The Revised
Uniform PartnershipAct: Not Ready for Prime Time, 49 Bus. LAW. 45, 55-57 (1993) (criticizing
the confusion
stemming from the RUPA's contortion of contract duties).
30. REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404(d) and cmt. 5.
31. See, e.g., Bohatch v. Butler & Binion, 977 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1998) (holding that the
expulsion of a
partner for engaging in whistle-blowing activities does not constitute a breach of fiduciary
duty); Beasley v.
Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, No. CL-94-8646 "AJ", 1996 WL 438777 (Fla. Cir. Ct. July
23, 1996) (ruling
that partners breached their fiduciary duty by expelling a branch office partner when no expulsion
provision
existed in the partnership agreement); Lawlis v. Knightlinger & Gray, 562 N.E.2d 435 (Ind.
App. 1990)
(approving expulsion of a partner for alcoholism); Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 523-24
(Wash. App. 1974)
(allowing expulsion of a partner for engaging in political speech). An application of my central
thesis to
Bohatch can be found infra Part IV.
32. A recent Lexis search reveals that there are approximately 900 federal and state cases
that cite the
famous paragraph from Meinhard,and its popularity (at least for rhetorical value) apparently
continues. See,
e.g., NCAS Realty Mgmt. Corp. v. National Corp., 143 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 1998) ("A partner,
as a fiduciary, is
held to higher standards than those of the marketplace. 'Not honesty alone, but the punctilio
of an honor the
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior'.") (citing Meinhard).
33. REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404(c). The section also proscribes knowing
violation of the
law. Id.
34. See generally Allen W. Vestal, Choice ofLaw and the FiduciaryDuties of Partners
Under the Revised
Uniform PartnershipAct, 79 IOWA L. REv. 219, 232 (1994).
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35
Perhaps reflecting this doctrinal ambivalence, academic
imposed on corporations.
recent
commentators have exhibited substantial discord in recent years over whether
normative
on
justifiable
are
partnerships
trends in36 fiduciary duty standards within
grounds.
In contrast to the strict fiduciary duties historically imposed on partners, managers
of fiduciary
of public corporations have tended to face a somewhat more relaxed set
officers and
by
37
self-dealing
prohibiting
duties. Most corporate statutes, while facially
procedural
(both
exceptions
numerous
directors, proceed almost immediately to supply
on selfstatute
Delaware's
transaction.
and substantive) that will cleanse a self-interested
distinct
three
under
38
occur
to
transaction
dealing, for example, allows an interested
and
disclosure
(2)
directors;
disinterested
circumstances: (1) disclosure and approval by
39
shareholders
or
directors
by
approval
(3)
approval by disinterested shareholders; or
40
(whether interested or not) and fairness of the transaction to the corporation. Moreover,
self-serving
the duty of loyalty appears to be largely ineffectual41 when the alleged
redress
seek
to
order
in
Finally,
behavior involves predominantly intangible perquisites.
a
actions,
derivative
bring
to
from purported violations, shareholders are often required
requirements
demand
as
such
process made extremely difficult by procedural obstacles
to special litigation committees (which often act as gatekeepers
and the deference given
42
against such suits).
The fiduciary duty of care within public corporations is arguably even more
marginalized, largely swallowed up by two significant exceptions. The powerful
"business judgment rule" essentially acts as a legal presumption that corporate fiduciaries
that
have exercised requisite skill in carrying out their appointed duties-a presumption

that would exonerate
35. Delaware's corporate law, for example, allows a charter to include a provision
§ 102(b)(7) (1991);
8,
tit.
ANN.
CODE
DEL.
See
care.
of
duty
directors and officers who breach their fiduciary
of the Corporate
Analysis
Strategic
A
Gold:
to
Opportunities
Servile
Turning
Talley,
Eric
also
see
statutes in other
exoneration
similar
(enumerating
(1998)
n.20
287
Opportunities Doctrine, 108 YALE L.J. 277,
states).
PartnershipAct of
36. Compare Allan Vestal, Fundamental ContractarianErrorin the Revised Uniform
of loyalty in the RUPA),
duty
the
of
relaxation
the
critiquing
(harshly
(1993)
525
523,
REV.
L.
B.U.
73
1992,
loyalty both for its
with Ribstein, supra note 29, at 52-55 (criticizing the RUPA's articulation of the duty of
excessive strictness and for its contractual immutability).
37. ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 798-800 (1986).
38. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(1991).
have
39. While section 144(a)(2) appears on its face not to require a disinterested vote, Delaware courts
such, defendants must
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sufficient
than
rather
necessary
articulating
as
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interpreted
by the votes of
be able to demonstrate fairness when the outcome of the shareholder vote is largely determined
interested shareholders. See Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976).
40. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(l)-(3) (1991).
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(1999).
787-90
751,
24 J. CORP. L.
430
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can be overcome only by a showing of managerial recklessness, fraud, or waste. 43
Additionally, many states now have so-called "exoneration statutes," which either permit
(or sometimes mandate) liability limits and/or indemnification for a fiduciary's violation
of her duty of care. 44 The power of these exceptions is reflected in considerable case law,
in which courts adamantly refrain from scrutinizing a fiduciary's exercise of judgment,
even in the face of considerable evidence that such actions were almost certainly
45
misguided.
The historical discontinuity in fiduciary duty law between partnerships and public
corporations has made the close corporation a troublesome battleground for courts and
commentators. Often dubbed "incorporated partnerships," close corporations share a
number of the same structural characteristics with their unincorporated counterparts. As
with partnerships, it is not uncommon for all (or most) shareholders in a close corporation
to exercise managerial duties at the firm. 46 Moreover, the residual claimants in both
organizations lack access to thick capital markets to sell their shares. This deficiency both
makes it more costly for dissatisfied owners to exit, and it impedes the prospect of
outside monitoring through the market for corporate control-a non-trivial source of
discipline for managers in public corporations. 47 These similarities have not gone
unnoticed by a number of courts, who have advocated treating corporate fiduciaries in
closely-held firms using the same approach as employed towards partnerships. 48 Some
within the academy have concurred, arguing that the partnership analogy is sufficiently

43.

See ANTONIO BERNARDO ET AL.., A THEORY OF LEGAL PRESUMPTIONS (USC Olin Working Paper

#99-8, 1999) (availableat <http://papers.ssm.com/paper.taf?abstractid=161189>) (summarizing doctrine and
demonstrating that the business judgment rule may be justified if costs imposed by litigation outweigh the
marginal benefits from enhanced managerial effort).
44. The exoneration statute in Delaware, for example, permits a charter to limit or eliminate a director's
personal liability from a breach of the fiduciary duty of care, but it specifically excepts all duty-of-loyalty
violations (including the taking of corporate opportunities). DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1996). A
majority of other states have similar limitations. See Talley, supranote 35, at 287 n.20 (enumerating statutes).
45. E.g., Kamin v. American Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976), aff'd, 387 N.Y.S.2d
993 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (holding that the business judgment rule protects a decision by directors of
defendant corporation to pay an in-kind dividend consisting of depressed-value securities to shareholders, rather
than selling such securities at an approximate tax savings to the corporation of $8 million, because the in-kind
distribution would allow the directors to avoid recording the capital loss in the firm's accounting statements).
46. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of FiduciaryDuties in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L.
REv. 1675, 1690 (1990) (noting the "significant stock ownership by close corporation management"); Lawrence
E. Mitchell, ProfessionalResponsibility and the Close Corporation: Toward a Realistic Ethic, 74 CORNELL L.
REv. 466, 476-77 (1989) (enumerating a host of factors indicative of a close corporation, including "a
substantial identity of ownership and management").
47. See John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable Are US
Public Corporations,24 J. CORP. LAW 837 (1999).
48. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515-16 (Mass. 1975) (stating that shareholders of
close corporations "must discharge their management and stockholder responsibilities in conformity with [a]
strict good faith standard," in contrast to directors and shareholders of widely-held corporations, who are
subject to a "somewhat less stringent standard of fiduciary duty"); cf. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc.,
353 N.E.2d 657, 661 (Mass. 1976) (likening the fiduciary duties of close-corporation shareholders to those of
general partners, but qualifying the duty with a balancing test that hinges on whether the complained-of act can
be justified on the grounds of serving a "legitimate business purpose").
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afforded to fiduciaries
strong to warrant the weakening of a number of the legal defenses
49
rule.
judgment
business
the
as
such
corporations,
of public
On the other hand, not all courts and commentators have been equally infatuated
with the partnership metaphor. Delaware, for example, remains somewhat agnostic about
the wholesale importation of fiduciary duties from partnership law when a close
obligations. 50
corporation has not clearly manifested a desire to be governed by such
Moreover, many critics maintain that the analogy misses a number of practical
differences between partnerships and close corporations (such as participation/withdrawal
rules, relationship-specific investments, and information asymmetries) that might have a
51
Perhaps more
substantive effect on the optimal content of fiduciary obligations.
signal an
may
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to
decision
pointedly, some argue, the procedurally-costly
duties,
fiduciary
permissive
more
to
subjected
express desire of a firm's participants to be
and
treatment
as
tax
(such
choice
that
of
legal consequences
notwithstanding the other
52
rights).
liability
limited
It is here where the debate over the relationship between fiduciary duties and
ownership structure largely resides. Recent statutory innovations, such as limited liability
companies, limited liability partnerships, and limited liability limited partnerships, have
done little to broker a peace. If anything, the lack of a well-developed fiduciary duty
53
doctrine within such forms has simply added fuel to an already caustic fire. This
continuing discord is undoubtedly due to a number of factors, not the least of which is a

49. See. e.g., Hetherington & Dooley, supranote 2, at 2 (arguing that a close corporation is the "functional
equivalent" of a partnership, and advocating the creation of a "put" option for dissatisfied shareholders in a
close corporation); Mahoney, supra note 2, at 6-18 (arguing same); F. Hodge O'Neal, Preventative Law:
Tailoring the CorporateForm of Business to EnsureFair Treatment of All, 49 MISS. L.J. 529, 533 (noting that
the purpose of forming a close corporation stems solely from a desire for limited liability or other
considerations distinct from fiduciary obligations. Blair and Stout briefly consider the famous holding in Dodge
v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919), that a director and controlling shareholder, Henry Ford, could not
legitimately refuse a demand from minority shareholders that the corporation distribute its profits in dividends
rather than reinvesting it in new corporate projects. Blair & Stout, supra note 2, at 301-302, reprintedin 24 J.
CORP. L. 751, 788-89 (1999). The authors argue that the court's lack of deference to Ford's business judgment
in this case was perhaps justified because the firm was a close corporation. Id. at 302, reprinted in 24 J. CORP.
L. 751, 788-89.
50. Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380 (Del. 1993) (rejecting the adoption of ad hoc rules for
minority shareholders' rights in close corporations absent express provisions in the charter supporting such
rules).
51. See Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Waiting for the Omlet to Set: Match-Specific Assets and
Minority Oppression in the Close Corporation,24 J. CORP. L. (1999).
52. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 250 (criticizing other commentators who presume that
these other legal consequences are the sole driving forces behind incorporation).
53. See Terry A. O'Neill, Reasonable Expectations in Families, Businesses, and Family Businesses: A
Comment on Rollock, 73 IND. L.J. 589, 596 n.36 (1998) ("The scope and nature of fiduciary duties concerning
joint owners of partnerships, limited partnerships, and limited liability companies have been highly
controversial recently."). The statutory texts are similarly of little help. The Delaware Limited Liability
Company Act, for example, goes to great pains to describe how members of an LLC can contract around
fiduciary duties, but says nothing about whether such duties are, as a default matter, similar to those in other
organizational forms. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101 (b), (c)(2) (1993). Moreover, there is a paucity of case
law for prescribing the applicable standards of fiduciary obligations in LLCs. See, e.g., LARRY RIBSTEIN &
PETER LETSOU, BusINEss ASSOCIATIONS § 9.08[C] (1996) (noting the absence of doctrine in this area).
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profound disagreement over the fundamental purpose of fiduciary duties. 54 But even so,
other characteristics of the debate are equally unsettling. Those advocating the
partnership analogy to close corporations, for example, must contend with a significant
challenge of explaining why existing statutory heterogeneity seems to have given rise to
behavioral heterogeneity. In other words, if certain types of governance structures were
unambiguously conducive to wasteful, managerial rent-seeking, then why haven't most
or all managers pushed their firms in that direction? Similarly, those who advocate the
merits of regulatory self-selection have largely failed to explain precisely what factors
would drive some closely-held firms to favor strict fiduciary standards while others
would favor weaker ones.
A team-production approach, however, may lend analytical insights that help resolve
these questions. The next part focuses on one such insight, arguing that a teamproduction perspective reveals an underappreciated distinction between widely- and
closely-held organizational structures. In widely-held firms, the monitoring of
management can be conducted by a separate third-party "hierarch" (such as a board of
directors), whose primary purpose is to keep tabs on managerial misconduct. Within
closely-held firms, however, this monitoring task frequently comes from one source: the
managers themselves, monitoring one another. The consequences of these distinct intrafirm monitoring structures, I shall argue, holds important consequences for both statutory
design and doctrinal application.
III. MONITORING, DETERRENCE, AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES: AN EXAMPLE

In this part, I endeavor to illustrate my principal argument more formally, analyzing
a stylized numerical example of team production within two different governance
regimes. Under the first regime, team members play dual roles as both productive
contributors and mutual monitors; under the second, an intervening hierarch takes on all
monitoring duties within the firm, leaving other team members to engage solely in
productive activities. As a general matter, the former of these structures is intended to be
representative of a closely-held firm-such as a close corporation or general
partnership-in which the putative "owners" of the firm also tend to play an important
role in productive decisions. Correspondingly, the latter of these governance structures is
more analogous to a paradigmatic public corporation, in which shareholders play little or
no role in productive activities, but act (individually or through their board of directors)
as auditors or monitors of management. 55 I will use this analysis to demonstrate that
rigorous fiduciary duties, while perhaps justifiable on independent grounds, can pose
unique problems for closely-held firms by creating inefficient incentives to substitute
monitoring activities for productive effort.

54. For a taste, compare EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, with PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW
(Lawrence Mitchell, ed. 1995).
55. To be sure, this distinction is an aggregate one, and many other permutations exist. For instance,
although U.S. public corporations are characterized by diffuse ownership structures, there are numerous public
corporations in which a control share is nonetheless owned by a member of management. Conversely, within
some close corporations and partnerships, management does not have a significant ownership share. See R. LA
PORTA ET AL., CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AROUND THE WORLD (National Bureau of Econ. Research
Working
Paper No. 6625, 1998).
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Before beginning, however, I caution the reader that the analysis presented below is
admittedly stylized, designed to isolate the interaction between fiduciary duties and
governance form in a static setting. While certainly helpful for developing intuitions,
models such as these probably fail to capture at least some of the complexity and nuance
that pervade real-world situations. Consequently, one might be able to generate variations
in which monitoring costs, while present, are insufficiently compelling to justify the
distinction in fiduciary law that I highlight below. Indeed, after walking the reader
variations. 5 6
through the basic numerical example, I shall explicitly analyze seven such
Nevertheless, the tradeoff between monitoring and productive activities is, I believe,
endemic to close governance structures, and is therefore almost always a legitimate
consideration in the design of fiduciary duties (even if not ultimately a determinative
consideration in every instance).
A. Framework
Consider a productive enterprise ("the firm") that requires a team for the completion
of a revenue-generating project. Although the precise nature of the project is not of
particular relevance, suppose for concreteness that it involves the production and sale of a
single idiosyncratic good, which is both specialized and difficult to manufacture. As a
consequence of the relatively small market and the firm's capacity constraint, the firm
will sell either zero or one item. Should the firm succeed at making a sale, it will reap a
payoff of $100. If not, the project yields nothing.
The prospect of a successful sale hinges, in part, on the efforts of a two-person
productive team within the firm, whose members are denoted, respectively, as "Player A"
and "Player B." 57 Each player is risk-neutral and possesses limited wealth (normalized
arbitrarily to be zero 58). Moreover, each player is assumed to make an unmonitorable
choice about whether to expend "high" or "low" effort in productive activities.
Encouraging high effort by the team members is important because it enhances the
59
likelihood the project succeeds (i.e., a sale is made). Accordingly, the likelihood of a
56. See infra Part III.D.
57. The assumption of two players is a simplifying one, and can be generalized to "n" players. The
analysis draws much of its inspiration-as most of the team production literature-from Alchian and Demsetz's
notable early insights. See Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization,62 AM. ECON. REV.777 (1972).
58. 1shall comment on the effects of relaxing this assumption infra Part III.D.
59. The alert reader will note that I refer to "effort"-a term more consistent with duties of care than
duties of loyalty (which call for terms such as "self-denial" or "finest loyalty"). I do so predominantly to
maintain consistency with the literature on moral hazard, or "hidden actions." See, e.g., Bengt Holmstrom,
Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324 (1982) (using the same terminology). From a technical
perspective, failure to expend effort is indistinguishable from re-directing hard assets away from the firm and to
one's individual account. In this analytic respect, a moral-hazard model does not distinguish between "shirking"
and "stealing," even though fiduciary duty law does attempt to do so. Though I do not attempt to make any
meaningful distinction between these actions here, there is a live enterprise among corporations scholars
generating explanations as to why these two problems are (or should be seen as) distinct. Compare Robert
Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship:Its Economic Characterand Legal Consequences,
66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045 (1991) (rooting the distinction in the differing probabilities of detection for
misconduct), with Jennifer Arlen et al., Endowment Effects and Fiduciary Duties: An Experimental Analysis
(1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (using experimental approaches to test for the importance
of the distinction in cognitive and behavioral phenomena).
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success (and thus a payoff of $100 for the firm) is a function of the players' effort level,
as illustrated in Table 1 below. As the table illustrates, high effort by both parties leads
to a successful sale 80% of the time. Low effort by both leads to a 50% success rate. And
finally, if one player expends high effort but the other expends low effort, the likelihood
of success is 70%.

Player B
High Effort

Low Effort

High Effort

80%

70%

Low Effort

70%

50%

PlayerA

TABLE 1: LIKELIHOOD OF PROJECT SUCCESS AS FUNCTION OF PLAYERS' EFFORT

Hard work, however, does not come cheaply. In particular, while it is costless for a
player to expend a low effort, high effort imposes a non-monetary cost on her, which I
shall assume (somewhat arbitrarily) to be $8.60 It is this personal cost of effort that
animates the chief incentive problem in this model: for while the costs of effort are borne
privately, A and B may not be able to appropriate the full value of their contributions.
Moreover, the beneficiaries of A's and B's effort depend, in part, on the ownership
structure of the firm. Thus, for example, if A and B were in a general partnership, they
would (at least as a default matter) split the profits of the firm evenly. 6 1 Alternatively, if
A and B managed the firm on behalf of a third party, their payoffs would consist of their
expected wages from the firm, with the third party claiming any residual surplus. This
observation suggests that the players might choose to withhold high effort in some
circumstances, even though joint expenditure of high effort would be the socially
62
efficient choice.
As an initial matter, each player's actual choice of effort is private information.
However, it may be possible for others to detect whether an agent withholds effort by
monitoring her behavior. Explicitly, suppose that there exists a good (but not perfect)
monitoring technology which, if utilized, can detect a player expending low effort fourout-of-five times (i.e., a low-effort player will be "caught" 80% of the time). The

60. This assumption is "somewhat" arbitrary, because in order for collective action problems to be
present, the private cost of high effort must lie somewhere between the private benefits and the joint benefits of
increased effort (a condition that is satisfied here so long as private costs of high effort are less than $10). Note
that the assumption that low effort costs the agent nothing is without loss of generality. The key from an
agency-costs perspective is the cost differential between expending high effort and low effort, a difference that
obviously exists here.
61. See UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACr § 18(a) (1914); REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr § 401(b)
(1996).
62. To see this, simply note that the expected profits of the firm if both players expend high effort are $80,
less the $16 in joint effort costs, for a social net surplus of $64. In contrast, if only one party expends high
effort, the expected net social surplus is $62 = ($70 - $8). Finally, if neither expends high effort, the expected
net social surplus is $50.

1014

The Journal of CorporationLaw

[Sumnmer

monitoring technology entails no false positives: should a player expend high effort, she
will never be erroneously detected as shirking. 63 Moreover, it is assumed that detection
by the monitor is verifiable in court (and therefore potentially the basis of a subsequent
action for breach of fiduciary duty).
The identity of the monitor (should any monitoring occur) once again depends on
the ownership structure of the firn. If the finn is closely-held, then any monitoring of the
players' actions must necessarily come from A and B themselves, monitoring one
another. If, however, the firm is organized such that there is a third party capable of
monitoring the players (such as shareholders or their representatives in a public
64
corporation), I shall assume that the third party is the sole monitor. Like effort,
she may be) must incur a
monitoring is costly: I assume that the monitor (whoever
65
private cost of $8 for each player she decides to scrutinize.
Having described the fundamentals of the game, it is now possible to consider
explicitly the role of fiduciary duty law. As noted in the previous Part, the role of monitor
is nearly always concomitant with the identity of the beneficiary of a fiduciary duty.
Indeed, partners-who must presumably monitor one another-also owe fiduciary duties
both to the partnership and to one another. Managers in a public corporation-who are
presumably monitored by shareholders and/or boards-owe fiduciary duties to the
corporation, and, at least derivatively, to the shareholders. In an attempt to reflect this
practical reality, then, I shall assume that the monitor, should she detect low effort by a
player, has the unique legal standing to bring an action against the shirking player for
breach of fiduciary duty. (Note that because the monitoring technology entails no false
positives, all such cases that are brought are legitimate).
Because my ultimate enterprise is to formulate normative arguments about the
optimal "strength" of fiduciary duty law within a team-production environment, it is
necessary to represent the law in a way that allows variations in its substantive "bite." To
this end, I assume that if a player is successfully sued for breaching her fiduciary duty,
she must disgorge to the plaintiff a fraction of her gross payofffrom the game, denoted
by the Greek letter 0. I shall assume that 0 must fall somewhere between zero and one.
63. This assumption may be relaxed, but doing so provides few insights and distracts from analytical
clarity.
64. Other permutations are of course possible in a public corporation. Indeed, the third party might engage
in monitoring and also give the other parties incentives to monitor one another. As the reader shall see,
however, in those situations where monitoring effects predominate, the existence of the third party is critical
precisely because she can divest the agents of their incentives to monitor excessively. Moreover, because it is
predominantly the shareholders that benefit from fiduciary duties in public corporations, the incentive of the
shareholders to monitor managers is, as a default matter, greater than the incentives of managers to monitor one
another.
65. The costs of monitoring and effort are assumed equal simply for convenience. It is possible to
generalize to other monitoring cost values without substantially affecting the qualitative arguments presented
below. I shall take up the possibility of varying monitoring costs infra Part III.D. In some situations, of course,
one might argue that monitoring and productive effort are complements rather than substitutes, and that it is
essentially costless to monitor when one is expending productive effort. In such situations, the tradeoff between
monitoring and productivity is clearly absent. Such pure complementarity, however, seems unlikely in most
organizations. Indeed, although there may be some basic elements of effort (such as keeping long hours in the
office) that enhance one's monitoring capabilities, other elements of productive effort require sustained
attention from the individual team member-attention that is compromised if she is also keeping tabs on the
activities of her counterparts at the firm.
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The interpretation of 0 is quite simple-it is a measure of the relative strength of
fiduciary duty law. 66 For instance, 0=0 denotes a duty that is utterly toothless, in which a
player who is caught withholding effort need not disgorge any of her private payoff to the
aggrieved plaintiff. Conversely, 0=1 denotes a rigorous doctrine, in which a detected
shirker must always disgorge her private payoff, leaving her with nothing. (The reader
should note, of course, that one could entertain the possibility of an even more stringent
fiduciary duty rule, specifying 0>1, representing punitive damages in addition to
complete disgorgement. However, because the agent's wealth is limited-and in fact
normalized at zero-punitive damages would be unrecoverable, and such a rule would
have the same strategic and substantive effect as a complete disgorgement rule of 0=1).67
For methodological consistency, I shall adhere in what follows to a modified version
of contractarianism, defining a legal rule to be "optimal" if it maximizes the expected
joint welfare of all the firm's participants, implicitly asserting that joint-wealth
maximization is the most plausible outcome of bargaining among the firm's constituents
in the absence of transaction and bonding costs. 68 My principal thesis, however, is not
exclusively wedded to this particular normative metric. On the contrary, my argument is
solely about incentive structure; as such, it holds relevance for virtually any view of the
finn positing that fiduciary duties represent an incentive device for deterring individuals
from pursuing their own ends at the expense of other constituencies. 6 9
That said, it is now possible to begin analyzing the role of fiduciary duty law in
creating-and sometimes confounding-value-increasing investments of effort, and how
such effects vary according to the underlying governance structure. Accordingly, the
following two subsections examine the role of fiduciary law within (i) a closely-held
structure, such as a general partnership, where participants must monitor one another; and
(ii) a widely-held structure, in which a third-party hierarch is predominantly responsible
for monitoring team members.
B. Closely-Held Structure
Consider a regime in which A and B are organized as a closely-held firm. A
hallmark of such a structure is the dual role played by the participants: they are the

66. The alert reader might object to this definition of fiduciary duty law, arguing that complete
disgorgement of a fiduciary's gain is always the presumptive remedy for breaching one's fiduciary duty. The
model is capable of accommodating such an interpretation, however. In order to do so, simply reinterpret 0 to
denote the probability that the fiduciary is found liable, with the presumptive remedy being the fiduciary's
private payoff during that period. Because both parties are assumed to be risk-neutral, this description is
substantively identical to that in the text.
67. I take up the possible effects of relaxing the wealth constraint infra Part III.D. The reader should also
notice that the value of 0 as defined reflects the actual damages that the defendant must pay to the plaintiff, as
opposed to the putative damages paid to the company, out of which the defendant could make a pro-rataclaim.
See e.g., Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255 (Mass. 1989) (applying such a rule in the context of a
partnership dissolution). It would be entirely possible to express damages in terms of this latter formulation, but
doing so adds further confusion to the analysis without providing significant insights.
68. See Talley, supra note 35, at 316-22 (discussing the appropriate maximand for the firm, and arguing
that absent significant ex ante bonding costs, a joint-wealth objective is probably the most defensible).
69. As noted, supra note 9, the normative view of fiduciary duties as an incentive device appears in both
contractarian and communitarian corporations scholarship.
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principal contributors to the firm's productive tasks, and they also share equally in the
surplus generated by the firm, thus making them the sole monitors of one another.
Within this environment, then, each player must form strategy according to three
70
mutually exclusive actions (or "pure strategies") that she might pursue. First, she might
spend her time exerting high effort in bringing about the project's success (hereinafter
denoted as "High Effort"). Alternatively, she might decide to spend her time monitoring
her partner's activities, endeavoring to expose whether her counterpart is withholding
effort ("Monitor"). Finally, she might decide neither to expend high effort herself nor to
monitor her counterpart, but rather simply to expend a low level of effort ("Low Effort").
Recall from above that only if a player chooses "High Effort" does the likely success of
the project increase as described in Table 1.71 Consequently, at least from the standpoint
of the project's success rate, the pure strategy "Monitor" has the same effect as does
"Low Effort." Moreover, both "Effort" and "Monitor" are expensive strategies, imposing
a non-monetary cost equivalent to $8 on a player who employs them. In contrast, the
"Low Effort" strategy represents the analytic baseline and imposes no such costs.
Because A and B are, by definition, the sole residual claimants of any net surplus
generated by the project, their private payoffs are easy to describe. Each payoff consists
of three possible components. First, should the project prove successful, each player will
receive a one-half share of the firm's payoff, or $50.72 Second, any player who chooses
either to exert effort or to monitor will incur a certain non-monetary cost of $8. Finally, in
the event that one player chooses to monitor while her counterpart chooses to do nothing,
there is a four-out-of-five chance that the latter will be detected, and must disgorge a 0fraction of her $50 participation should the project be a success. Using these payoffs, it is
possible to assemble a "hybridized" normal-form of this game, illustrating the expected
payoffs of the parties from each possible pure strategy profile, illustrated in Figure 1.73

70. It is worth pointing out that while each of these posited actions is assumed mutually exclusive, the
players are not restricted to selecting one of these actions with certainty. Rather, the equilibria analyzed below
also admit so-called "mixed strategy" profiles, in which a player adopts a strategy that randomizes between two
or more pure strategies. A probabilistic strategy such as this is conceptually similar to a behavior in which one
divides her time between the various pure strategies. See infra note 75.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 57-60.
72. As noted above, I shall assume that the firm's distributions as a general matter are governed by the
default rules that apply to partnerships. As such, each partner receives a one-half-share of any surplus
generated.
73. It is important to note that this normal-form representation is "hybridized" because it includes only the
expected payoffs of the parties, and not their actual payoffs. Thus, for example, consider the expected payoffs in
the cell from the Figure corresponding to the expenditure of "High Effort," by both parties. In such a situation,
neither party will actually ever receive a payoff of $32 (as depicted in the Figure), but rather that is the payoff
each can expect to receive on average. Explicitly, because both players expend high effort, the probability that
the project is a success is 0.8. This implies that 20% of the time the project will prove unsuccessful, and each
party's payoff will be equal to -$8, corresponding to the (unrequited) cost of enhanced effort. On the other hand,
80% of the time, the project will be successful, and the players will split the $100 payoff, thereby leaving each
with a payoff of $50-48=$42 (subtracting out the cost of high effort). In sum, then, the average each player can
expect from this pure strategy profile is (0.2)(-$8) + (0.8)($42) = $32. The fact that this normal form expresses
expected and not actual payoffs is important, particularly if one wishes to analyze the repeat play of this game.
In such a dynamic setting, it may be impossible to ensure in a given round whether the other player has
withheld effort contrary to some posited dynamic norm of behavior. For further comments on this point, see
Part III.D., infra.
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PlayerB

PlayerA

High Effort

Monitor

Low Effort

High Effort

$32,$32

$27,$27

$27,$35

Monitor

$27,$27

$17,$17

$17+200,$25-200

Low Effort

$35,$27

$25-200, $17+200

$25,$25

FIGURE 1: HYBRIDIZED NORMAL FORM OF PRODUCTION GAME

Having pieced together the parties' respective payoffs from each possible purestrategy action, it is now possible to describe the behavior that would plausibly emerge
from rational play within this strategic setting. Note, however, that because the legal
policy parameter (0) is embedded in the payoff matrix illustrated above, the equilibria
from this game may change as one varies the underlying legal rule. Consequently, it is
convenient to subdivide the range of 0 into three "regions" of severity (corresponding
respectively to weak, moderate, and strong fiduciary duties).
1. Region 1: "Weak" FiduciaryDuties (0

0_1/2)
Consider first a situation in which fiduciary law is relatively weak. Specifically,
suppose that the law mandates that if a player is detected withholding effort, she must
disgorge, at most, half of her contingent share in the project's success to the other party
(and perhaps as little as nothing). With such a low-powered incentive structure, it seems
unlikely that any value of 0 in this region would be capable of inducing maximal effort
by the parties. This surmise turns out to be correct. In this region, there are three distinct
Nash equilibria, 74 two of them in pure strategies and a third in so-called "mixed

All other cell values in the Figure are (for the most part) computed in a similar fashion
to that
described above, and their derivations are therefore omitted. However, because of its slightly
more algebraic
form, it may be helpful to describe the formulation of the players' payoffs when one player
chooses "Monitor"
and the other chooses "Low Effort." Consider, for instance, the bottom-center cell of the
Figure, corresponding
to a "Low Effort" action by Player A and a "Monitor" action by Player B. In this cell, because
neither player is
expending high effort, the probability that the project is a success is 0.5. Accordingly, both
A and B can expect
to receive a $50 share in profits half of the time. In addition, player B is expending monitoring
effort, which
costs her $8 with certainty. Finally, because Player B is monitoring the behavior of
Player A, and because
Player A is withholding effort, there is an 80% chance that B will detect A's actions,
in which case A must
disgorge to B $500 whenever the project is a success. Collecting all of these terms, Player
A's payoff is equal to
(0.5)($50) - (0.8)(0.5)($500) = $(25-200), and Player B's payoff is equal to (0.5)($50) - $8
+ (0.8)(0.5)($500) =
$(17+200).
74. A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies for each player which, if adopted by each,
is self-enforcing.
That is, no player has an affirmative incentive to deviate from her prescribed strategy
so long as the other
players employ their prescribed strategies. See Eric Talley, InterdisciplinaryGap-Filling:
Game Theory and the
Law, 22 J. L. & Soc. INQ. 1055, 1059 (1997).
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strategies." 7 5 None of them, however, is able to induce socially efficient levels of
76
effort.
Let us begin with the two pure-strategy equilibria, each of which call for one of the
players to expend high effort and for the other player to expend low effort. These
equilibria correspond to the lower-left and upper-right cells in Figure 1. To understand
why these are in fact equilibria, let us focus on the lower-left cell, which calls for low
effort by player A and high effort by player B-a profile that yields expected payoffs of
$35 and $27 for A and B, respectively. Consider the incentives of each player, assuming
that the other player has adopted the strategy specified by the posited equilibrium. Player
A, presuming that Player B will expend high effort, has two alternatives to doing nothing.
First, she might choose to expend high effort herself, incurring an $8 effort cost and
77
increasing the expected joint payoff of the project by $10. However, because Player A
would have to split this joint gain with her counterpart, she would actually lose $3 on
average from working hard, and thus her expected payoff will decrease from $35 to $32.
Alternatively, Player A could choose to monitor Player B's actions. Such a choice,
however, would be even more foolhardy, since A will expend $8 monitoring a player
who she knows (by hypothesis) is expending productive effort-a wasteful expenditure
that only reduces A's expected payoff from $35 to $27. Consequently, if A presumes that
B is expending effort, A's best option is to do nothing.
Now consider Player B's options, under the hypothesis that Player A is expending
low effort. Player B also has two alternatives to expending high effort. First he might
choose to expend low effort as well, thereby saving $8, but decreasing the joint payoff of
the project by $20; but since Player B stands to lose half of this joint reduction in the joint
payoff (or $10), withholding effort would have the net effect of reducing his expected
payoff from $27 to $25, and it is therefore unattractive to him. Alternatively, Player B
could choose to monitor Player A's actions, redirecting his $8 in effort expense towards
monitoring. Once again, foregoing productive effort would result in an expected personal
loss to B of $10 (and an expected joint loss of $20); however, monitoring affords B the
prospect of detecting A's shirking and recovering a 0-fraction of A's share in a successful
project-a prospect that would result in an expected gain for Player B equal to $20(0).78
So long as the expected benefits of monitoring are less than the expected costs therefrom
(i.e., $200 < $10), B would prefer expending effort to monitoring, thereby ensuring that
B's best response to A's action is to expend effort. Equivalently, then, the lower-left cell

75. A "mixed strategy equilibrium" is one in which a player randomizes in equilibrium over various pure
strategy actions, never predictably choosing one of them with certainty. In the famous "Rock-Paper-Scissors"
game, for instance, the only equilibrium is one with mixed strategies, in which each player randomizes among
the three available actions.
76. This should not come as a surprise. Indeed, it is generally impossible to induce optimal effort within
teams if one is constrained to "budget balancing" mechanisms (i.e., organizational structures in which all the
gains and loss from the venture are jointly captured by the team members). See, e.g.. Holmstrom, supranote 59,
at 325-27. As such, it will tum out than no value of 0 is able to induce first-best effort levels by team members
if the parties are wealth-constrained. See infra Part II1.D.
77. More specifically, she would increase the likelihood of a $100 joint payoff by 10-/o-from 70% to 80%
(remember that Player B is already assumed to be expending high effort)-which translates into an expected
increase of $10.
78. See supra note 73.
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in Figure
1 corresponds with a pure-strategy equilibrium of the game so long as 0 _<
79
1/2.
In addition to these two pure-strategy equilibria, Region I supports a third, mixedstrategy equilibrium, which prescribes that both players randomize between high and low
effort levels. Explicitly, it calls for each player to expend high effort with probability 0.4,
and low effort with probability 0.6. Neither party within this equilibrium engages in
monitoring of her counterpart. 80 There are a few interesting features of this equilibrium
that bear pointing out. First, it is relatively unpredictable, leaving uncertain from the ex
ante perspective whether both players will expend high effort, whether one will, or
whether neither will. Second, the mixed-strategy equilibrium is the only "symmetric"
equilibrium within this region, mandating an identical strategy for each player and
generating an identical expected payoff for each player of $29.8 1 Finally, in spite of the
aesthetic appeal of symmetry, the mixed-strategy equilibrium gives rise to a lower
expected joint surplus ($58) than that generated by either of the asymmetric pure-strategy
equilibrium ($62).
It is important to note that the multiplicity of equilibria in this region make it
difficult to predict with certainty exactly how rational players would behave in this game.
Indeed, this is a problem that is often endemic to game-theoretic approaches, particularly
in the context of private information. However, there may be a number of reasons to
believe that parties in a commercial setting would end up playing one of the (more
efficient) asymmetric equilibria. For instance, if the partnership requires any set-up costs,
and A and B both recognize the greater surplus generated by the pure-strategy equilibria,
then they may be able to agree on playing one of these equilibria, but mandating that the
party who is advantaged in that equilibrium pay the lion's share of the set-up costs.
Alternatively, even in the absence of set-up costs, the parties might commit to one of the
pure-strategy equilibria, and then reduce slightly the advantaged party's contingent share
in the surplus. 82 Finally, even without an explicit agreement to play one of the purestrategy equilibria, an implicit agreement may emerge as a result of social norms within
the relevant industry.8 3 Thus, the analysis that follows will generally presume that the

two pure-strategy profiles are the most plausible outcomes of this game in Region 1.

79. A virtually identical analysis applies to the other pure strategy equilibrium, represented by the
upperright cell of Figure 1, and is therefore omitted.
80. To see why this is an equilibrium, consider Player A's choice, conditional on Player B randomizing
in
the prescribed fashion (and remembering that 0 1/2). Using the values illustrated in Figure 1, it is
clear that if
Player A expends high effort, her expected payoff is ($32)(0.4)+($27)(0.6) = $29. Should Player A
expend low
effort, her expected payoff is ($35)(0.4)+($25)(0.6) = $29. Finally, should Player A spend her time
monitoring,
her expected payoff is ($27)(0.4)+($17+200)(0.6) = $21+120 ! $27, quite obviously less than the
$29 she
would receive with either of the other two strategies. Thus, if Player B is randomizing in the prescribed
way,
then Player A is indifferent between high effort and low effort, but is strictly opposed to monitoring.
This
implies that Player A would be willing to randomize between high and low effort with probabilities
0.4 and 0.6,
respectively. An identical analysis applies to Player B.
81. For explanation of this result, see supra note 80.
82. For example, the parties could agree up-front that only Player B will expend high effort, but
that in
compensation for her burden, she will receive approximately 55.7% of the project's total payoff, with
Player A
receiving the remaining 44.3%. Under such an agreement, each player will receive an expected net
payoff of
approximately $31.
83. For example, if the players were to interact within this context on a repeat basis, they might
reach an
implicit understanding that one of them would work during one period, and another would work the
next. Such

1020

The Journalof CorporationLaw

[Summer

2. Region 2: "Moderate" FiduciaryDuties (1/2 < 0 _2/3)
Now consider a situation in which fiduciary law is slightly more rigorous,
mandating that if a party is detected withholding effort, she must disgorge more than half,
but at most two-thirds of her contingent share to the other party. In such a situation, quite
they
obviously, the incentives for parties to monitor and punish shirking are stronger than
monitoring
higher-powered
the
that
then,
conjecture,
might
One
1.
were in Region
incentives in Region 2 would induce greater aggregate efforts on behalf of the parties,
and thus greater expected joint welfare. This conjecture, however, turns out to be
erroneous. Instead (and somewhat ironically), a moderate fiduciary duty in this region
actually detracts from the effort levels expended by the players in equilibrium, reducing
the maximum attainable level of social surplus.
In order to understand why, it is perhaps most helpful to recollect the analysis of
Region 1, which supported two pure-strategy equilibria, each mandating that one player
to
would expend low effort while the other expended high effort. Recall that in order
expending
party
the
that
verify
to
had
one
equilibrium,
an
confirm the existence of such
high effort-knowing that her counterpart was shirking-was not overly tempted either
to expend less effort as well, or, alternatively, to begin monitoring. This latter temptation
the
to monitor, however, is a direct function of the strength of fiduciary duty law: for if
0
if
(i.e.,
attractive
too
grew
suit
and
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through
damages
prospect of recovering
her
redirect
to
incentive
positive
a
have
would
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>1/2), then the effort-expending
this
attention away from effort and toward monitoring her co-venturer. It is exactly
law
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fiduciary
stronger
a
words,
other
In
2.
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high-effort
the
giving
by
unattainable
equilibria
strategy
renders each of these pure
reexpending player incentives to substitute out of productive activities and into
equilibria
pure-strategy
the
of
neither
Consequently,
distributional monitoring activities.
persist within Region 2.
It turns out that the only Nash equilibrium that persists in this region is the same
84
mixed-strategy equilibrium described above, which calls for each party to expend effort
with probability 0.4 and to do nothing with probability 0.6. Interestingly, just as before,
neither party ever engages in monitoring her counterpart within this equilibrium.
Evidently, the moderate strength of fiduciary duties in the region is enough to destroy the
and
viability of the pure-strategy equilibria, but insufficient to induce greater monitoring 85
equilibrium.
mixed-strategy
efficient)
less
also
(but
remaining
sole
effort levels in the
In
As above, the mixed strategy equilibrium gives rise to an expected joint surplus $58.
play.
rational
from
emerges
that
outcome
plausible
only
this region, however, this is the
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1
(1996).
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Part III.D.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 80-81.
yielded an
85. Recall from note 80, supra, that within the posited mixed strategy equilibrium, monitoring
strategies so long
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of
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3. Region 3: "Strong" FiduciaryDuties (2/3 <

1021
_1)

Finally, consider a situation in which fiduciary law is genuinely rigorous, mandating
that if a party is detected withholding effort, she must disgorge more than two-thirds, and
potentially all of her contingent share to the other party. In this region, the incentives for
parties to monitor and sanction shirking are maximal. Thus, if there is any chance for
strong fiduciary duties to play an efficiency-enhancing deterrence role, this is the one. As
it turns out, fiduciary duties within this region can play such a role, but one that
ultimately falls short of (in this particular case) generating enough social wealth to
surpass the most efficient outcomes from Region 1.
Note first that just as before, Region 3 is unable to support either of the asymmetric,
pure-strategy equilibria that existed in Region 1. In particular, because the prospect of
monitoring and subsequent legal action is sufficiently tempting (i.e., 0 > 2/3 > 1/2),
neither party will be content to expend high effort, rather than monitor, if she knows with
certainty that her counterpart is withholding effort.
As such, the only Nash equilibrium in this region continues to be in mixed
strategies. Unlike the mixed-strategy equilibria analyzed for other regions, however (in
which neither party monitored), here the equilibrium calls for the players to randomize
among all three pure strategies. Although the exact randomization probabilities vary with
0,86 they do so in rather predictable ways. As 0 increases from 2/3 to 1, the equilibrium
probability that each player monitors her counterpart steadily grows, from zero to 0.05.
Moreover, this increased monitoring activity carries with it a deterrent effect: over this
same interval, the fear of increased monitoring induces each player to increase the
probability of expending high effort, from 0.4 to 0.6. Finally (and logically), the
probability that each agent expends low effort decreases over this interval from 0.6 to
0.35. All tolled, this equilibrium yields an expected level of joint welfare that varies
between $58 and $60, distributed evenly between the players. 87
Figure 2 juxtaposes the conclusions from Regions 1, 2, and 3, illustrating the
maximum attainable level of expected joint welfare as each party's legal duty varies from
its most toothless (0=0) to its most rigorous (0=1) possible state. As Figure 2
demonstrates, a weak fiduciary duty (embodied in Region 1) is capable of supporting a
relatively high joint payoff of $62, a byproduct of the viability of the two asymmetric,
pure-strategy equilibria. As one moves toward a more moderate fiduciary duty (embodied
in Region 2), however, the pure-strategy equilibria cease to exist, and the maximal
attainable welfare drops precipitously to $58, corresponding to the unique mixed-strategy
equilibrium where players randomize between high and low effort. Finally, as the content
of fiduciary duties grows strongest (embodied in Region 3), the unique equilibrium
mandates randomization over all the potential strategies, thereby introducing some
deterrent effects and achieving an expected joint welfare ranging between $58 (for 0 near
2/3) and $60 (as 0 approaches 1).
86. The unique mixed strategy equilibrium in Region 3 calls for each player to mix among (High Effort,
Monitor, Low Effort} with probabilities { 1-2/(50), (30-2y(2002), (50+2)/(2002) ). To see that this is indeed an
equilibrium, one need simply confirm that if one player plays this strategy, then the other player's expected
payoff from each of her pure strategies is invariant and equal to $(32-2/0).
87. In particular, summing the payoffs specified in note 86, supra, the expected social welfare in Region 3
is equal to $(64-4/0), reaching a local maximum of $60 as 0 approaches 1.
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Region A
(3 equilibria)

Region C
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1

Strength of Fiduciary Duty Law (0)
FIGURE 2: MAXIMUM ATTAINABLE LEVEL OF JOINT EXPECTED WELFARE AS
FIDUCIARY DuTY LAW VARIES

It is evident from Figure 2 that strengthening the applicable fiduciary duty can play
an efficiency-enhancing role on the margin, since it enhances incentives for players to
monitor each other in equilibrium within Region 3, thereby creating a deterrent to
misconduct. Nonetheless, as Figure 2 demonstrates, such benefits may be unable to
eclipse the joint gains generated by either of the pure-strategy equilibria from Region 1equilibria that are viable only under the very weakest forms of fiduciary duty. An
affirmative way to state this point is as follows: Strengtheningfiduciary duties within
can lead to two conflicting effects: (a) an efficiency-enhancing
closely-held organizations
deterrence effect stemming fom one's enhancedfear of monitoring by her counterparts;
and (b) an efficiency-reducing monitoring efec stemming fom one's incentive toforego
productive tasks in order to spend more time monitoring her counterparts.An enhanced
fiduciary duty isjusufied on efficiency grounds when and only when the deterrenceeffect
overshadows the monitoring effect. By corollary, should the monitoring effect outweigh
the deterrence effect, it may be optimal to dilute-or perhaps even eliminate-the
practicalbite offiduciary duties.
It is important to keep in mind that the argument made above has utilized a
particular numerical example. As I will demonstrate below, it is possible to vary this
example in a way so that either the deterrence effect or the monitoring effect would
dominate. 88 Nevertheless, because there are no a priorireasons to believe that one effect
will predominate in all situations, and because the tradeoff appears endemic to the
closely-held organizational structure, the arguments above present a consideration that
should generally be accounted for in crafting and applying fiduciary duty law.
C. Widely-Held Structure
In contrast to the analysis from the previous subsection, productive teams within
widely-held firms need not manifest the same fundamental tradeoff between deterrence
and monitoring effects. Indeed, with the widely-held structure comes the imposition of a
88. See infra Part III.D.
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third party "hierarch" who, as the principal beneficiary of fiduciary duties, is also the
presumptive monitor of managerial opportunism. Within most settings, this third-party
hierarch represents public shareholders, as they are the residual claimants
on the
productive enterprise. For the purposes of my argument, however, this player
could be
anyone who is not a team member, including lenders, customers, the surrounding
community, or a combination thereof.89
The existence of a shareholder has three effects on the incentive structure of
the
numerical example. First, it facilitates decoupling of business revenues from the
payoffs
of the team. One of the problems in the closely-held organization is that it is a
"budgetbalancing" system: the parties' total gross payoff from the project must always
be equal
to the revenues the project generated. With an intervening hierarch, however,
the
aggregate wages paid to the team members need not correspond systematically
to the
revenues of the project. Second, because of the decoupling of project revenues
from
wages, the principal is able to craft for the players "incentive pay," promising
a high
wage in the event the project proves successful, and a low wage (or nothing) if
the project
fails. Unlike the previous case, in which the players were always presumed to
split the
$100 revenues, here the hierarch has significantly greater freedom to fine-tune
the
contingent rewards of the parties (either upward or downward). Finally,
and most
importantly, the interjection of a hierarch divorces incentives to monitor from incentives
to expend effort. As such, team members are no longer required to wear two
hats, and
thus are not exposed to the countervailing temptations that plagued the analysis
above.
Moreover, the hierarch takes on a specialized role of monitor, and is also undistracted
by
other incentives.
The numerical example above, therefore, if analyzed within a widely-held context,
tends to behave in a significantly different fashion. Because of space
and time
constraints, I shall not attempt to walk the reader through yet another arduous
exercise in
computing equilibrium strategy profiles-indeed, the possibilities of both incentive
pay
and monitoring would lead to a rather complicated analysis with numerous permutations.
Nevertheless, with the same set of parameter values, 90 a uniform conclusion appears
to
obtain: strong fiduciary duties (i.e., large values of 0) are never harmful,
and are
sometimes helpful to stem intra-team opportunism. In technical terms, then,
the
maximum attainable level of social welfare increases (weakly) in 0.
Despite these differences, there may be a number of other reasons (emanating from
outside the framework) why strong fiduciary duties might still be inadvisable in
at least
some public corporations. Some small-stakes shareholders, for example, might
wish to
use their status as beneficiaries inefficiently to hold up the firm, or will pass up
valuable
outside opportunities to monitor. Moreover, public corporations often have many
more
89. Rank-and-file employees, however, are not possibilities, since they are often team
members
themselves. Note, of course, that in most cases, the rules of legal standing for derivative and other
suits suggest
that the shareholders are the presumptive monitors. Indeed, shareholders have the unique ability
to sue the
corporation derivatively. See CLARK, supranote 37, at 639-40.
90. For instance, is assumed that the hierarch ("H") is the sole monitor of the team members,
who also
pays wages to Players A and B. Just as before, it is assumed that if H detects one of the team
members
withholding effort, fiduciary law requires that party to disgorge a 0-fraction of her wage to Player H,
where 0 <
0 < I. Effort is assumed once again to cost $8 to the players, and it also costs H $8 for each player
that she
decides to monitor.
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D. Variations,Limitations, and Caveats
example.
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trustworthy 94 or because monitoring costs are large. Not surprisingly, this variation
would tend to strengthen my central argument. To take an extreme case, suppose that
monitoring became so inaccurate that a monitoring party would detect cheating 80% of
the time regardless of whether her counterpart expended low effort. In such a situation,
the deterrence effect would completely disappear, since one's probability of being
detected (and found liable) does not depend on whether she expends effort. On the other
hand, the monitoring effect is alive and well: by spending all one's time monitoring, one
may be able to extract a portion of her counterpart's payoff 80% of the time. In such a
situation, a strict fiduciary duty could lead to a situation where both parties engage solely
in nonproductive monitoring.
2. Prevention
The form of monitoring analyzed above falls under the loose definition of
"detection": 95 A player who chooses to monitor her counterpart will (with some
probability) become informed of the latter's misfeasance, but only after the transgression
has already occurred. In many settings, however, this may not be the only form of
monitoring protocol available. Most notably, it seems plausible that individuals could
also engage in so-called "prevention," which operates at the ex ante stage as a form of
early detection. 96 Significantly, preventative monitoring allows (at least in theory) for the
implementation of measures that obviate misfeasance before it occurs. As such,
prevention has two alternative implications for my analysis. First, if it represents a less
costly method of monitoring than detection, then the analysis above would overstate the
extent to which monitoring costs are important. But second, even if prevention represents
a more costly form of monitoring, parties may nonetheless utilize it if their expected
payoffs from ex post detection were sufficiently small. In this latter case, preventative
monitoring might confound the policy-maker's attempt to encourage productive effort by
reducing 0 for firms dominated by the monitoring effect. 97
Although preventative monitoring is probably an important consideration generally,
it need not change the instant analysis as appreciably as one might guess. From a
practical standpoint, prevention can be accomplished by one of two methods: either (i)
prohibiting team members altogether from engaging in discretionary activities; or (ii)
allowing such activities, but subjecting them to extremely close real-time scrutiny. The
first option effectively subverts the very purpose of team production, and thus appears
somewhat inapposite to the motivating pretext of this Article. The second option may be
more plausible; but if so, the added vigilance it necessitates may render it a more costly
mechanism than the alternative of ex post detection.

94. Recall that the earlier example assumed an 80% detection rate with no false positives. One could
reduce this detection rate or add the possibility that a hard-working agent will be erroneously detected
as
shirking.
95. Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling CorporateMisconduct: An Analysis of Corporate
Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 687, 701-02 (1997); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should
Employees Be Subject to Finesand Imprisonment Given the Existence of CorporateLiability?, 13 INT'L REV.
L.
& ECON. 239, 241-42 (1993).
96. Arlen & Kraakman, supranote 95, at 701.
97. See supra Figure 2 and accompanying text.

1026

The Journalof CorporationLaw

[Summer

That being said, there remains the possibility that reducing the payoffs associated
with detection (0) might lead parties not to step up their productive efforts (as the
analysis above suggested), but rather to substitute inefficiently into more costly
preventative activities. But even here, a number of conceptual problems remain. Most
explicitly, it is unclear precisely how one's discovery of her counterpart's mischievous
intentions, standing alone, prevents much of anything. To take an extreme example,
suppose that the damages rule governing fiduciary duty lawsuits were 0=0 ($0 damages),
and that Player A had discovered, using preventative monitoring techniques, that her
counterpart intended to shirk. Suppose further that Player B, when confronted with A's
discovery, nonetheless announces that he intends to shirk anyway. What is A's recourse?
Assuming that physical intimidation is not possible, she may be limited to threatening
98
legal action if B carries out his stated intentions. But if such suits were subject to the
same damages rule that governs ex post detection (i.e., 0=0) then A's threat would not be
particularly daunting. In such an instance, it seems highly likely that the costly strategy of
preventative monitoring would be decidedly less attractive to A than either ex post
detection or increased productive effort.
3. Severe Free-Riding
One canonical feature of the example analyzed above was that it involved free riding
by the team players. Indeed, as the analysis within Region I illustrates, it may be an
equilibrium for one party to expend effort while the other coasts. Nevertheless, the freeriding problem could be even more severe than portrayed above. Consider, for example,
altering the probabilities given in Table 1 so that the probability of a success went from
50% (if neither party contributed effort) to 60% (if one of them did) to 70% (if both did).
In such a situation, one's marginal expected gain from expending effort is only $5,
regardless of the other player's action. Consequently, it is never worthwhile (in the
absence of large damages) for either party to contribute effort. With severe free-riding
problems like this, it is more likely that stronger fiduciary duties can play a beneficial
role. In particular, an increase in 0 may engender at least some equilibrium effort. At the
same time, however, the fundamental tradeoff between deterrence and monitoring effects
persists, at least on the margin. Although strong fiduciary duties would be optimal for
this particular variation, one can construct other variations involving severe free riding in
which the tradeoff still militates against the strongest fiduciary duties. As such, this
variation does not create a general license to ignore intra-firm monitoring concerns.
4. Deep Pockets
Because the numerical example normalized each player's wealth to be zero, the
maximum extractable penalty for detected misfeasance was necessarily equal to the
party's gross payoff (if any) from the game. Relaxing the parties' wealth constraint would
permit legal rules that forced detected shirkers to pay punitive damages in excess of their
private payoffs from the project. The threat of such added sanctions, as one would expect,
98. Another possibility is that Player A can threaten to use extra-legal reputational punishments and social
norms to deter Player B. Such a possibility, however, applies equally well to detection and prevention, and I
therefore address it separately infra Part III.D.7.
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can enhance the deterrence effect by increasing the expected costs of opportunism. In
terms of Figure 2, above, this would have the effect of expanding Region 3 rightward,
enhancing the joint-welfare effects of a strict fiduciary duty rule. As it turns out,
sufficient slack in the parties' wealth constraints has precisely this effect in the numerical
example above. In particular, if the parties held private wealth of approximately $38
each, then the equilibrium payoffs in Region 3 will surpass those in Region 1, thereby
making strong fiduciary duties optimal. Moreover, as one slackens the players' wealth
constraints more and more, the equilibrium outcome would tend incrementally (or
"asymptotically") to the first-best outcome of $64.
Once again, however, there are at least two limitations to the ultimate power of this
proposed variation. First, and most fundamentally, it requires that the parties possess
sufficient wealth to make the threat of punitive damages credible. Certainly, such a
condition may hold for some closely-held firms, particularly if the firm does not
distribute a significant portion of its earnings from period to period. However, it is not
difficult to find examples where liquidity-constrained partners or managers necessitate
regular disbursements, and are essentially judgment proof beyond the value of their
ownership stake in the firm. Second, just as in the previous variation, the marginal
tradeoff between deterrence and monitoring persists, a fact that may truncate (in some
situations) the gains one might generate from enhanced fiduciary obligations.
5. Non-Team Beneficiaries
Recall from the previous subsections that both players A and B were assumed
necessary for production at the firm. Indeed, even if one or both of them expended low
effort, their presence in the production process was nonetheless critical to generating any
payoff whatsoever. Many disputes within closely-held firms, however, involve a nonproductive owner. For example, the well-known Massachusetts case of Donahue v. Rodd
Electrotype Co. 9 9 -largely credited with introducing the "partnership analogy" to close
corporations-involved a plaintiff who was the widow and heir of a deceased
shareholder, but played no role in the productive team. 100 Quite clearly, Mrs. Donahue's
monitoring of others' actions at the firm did not cause her to substitute away from
productive duties-for she had no such duties.10 1
y
The possibility of non-productive beneficiaries represents an important limitation to
my central thesis. Indeed, in many ways such actors represent the very "third party
hierarch" posited to exist characterize a public corporation-a party capable of
monitoring without having to sacrifice productive effort. Such individuals, then, may
have a stronger claim as fiduciary beneficiaries than do their productive counterparts.
Nevertheless, there are a few caveats that deserve mention here. First, it is important to be
clear that a "non-productive" beneficiary is not necessarily equivalent to a "minority" or
"non-controlling" shareholder. To the contrary, the original example
would be just as
valid if, for example, player A owned 51% of the returns (and votes) and player B owned

99. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
100. Id. at 586.
101. Id. Indeed, even in Meinhardv. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928), the plaintiff took on
the role of a
"silent partner," whose active role in the productive enterprise was extremely
limited. Id. at 546-47.
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49%.102 The critical difference comes when a shareholder (minority or majority) is
completely outside the productive process. In such situations, a higher standard of
10 3
Second, it may be important to consider whether nonfiduciary duty may be justified.
productive beneficiaries in closely-held firms are as effective in monitoring management
as is a specialized hierarch in a widely-held fin. If such non-productive individuals'
access is limited to extremely uninformative or expensive monitoring technologies, then
their case for heightened beneficiary status begins to dwindle.
6. Multiple Equilibria
Recall from Figure 2 that the equilibrium dominance of weak fiduciary duties in
Region 1 is predicated, in part, on an assumption that the parties could coordinate on the
equilibrium to be played, and that they would systematically rule out any that fail to
maximize expected joint surplus. Making this assumption facilitated the assertion that
either of the two pure-strategy equilibria were the most plausible outcomes in that region.
However, the problem of multiple equilibria be may more troublesome than this
assumption implicitly asserts. Indeed, some corporations scholars have noted the non10 4
If one
trivial problems imposed by coordination failures within organizations.
region,
this
within
efficiently
to
coordinate
unable
be
would
parties
the
presumes that
10 5
which
they may end up playing the third, mixed-strategy equilibrium profile,
Recall
nothing.
doing
and
effort
expending
between
randomize
player
mandated that each
that this equilibrium was identical to the one in Region 2, and it tied for the lowest
expected social welfare ($58). Thus, if one is convinced that such coordination failures
will occur and that the law can play no role in effecting coordination among the parties,
then it may be best to sacrifice some potential efficiency gains by choosing a legal rule
that supports the most efficient unique equilibrium, represented by the strongest fiduciary
duty in Region 3.
This criticism, while valid, tends simultaneously to undercut its own persuasiveness.
Indeed, the principal problem with multiple equilibria is that there is no good reason to
believe that one equilibrium will be played instead of another. But even so, the assertion
that players will fail to coordinate (when the stakes from doing so are high) may need as
much, if not more, justification than the assertion that they will. Moreover, the criticism
is perhaps too quick to dismiss the ability of legal rules to play an important coordinating
10 6
role. Consider, for example, the doctrine announced in National Biscuit Co. v. Stroud,
a partnership case holding that in a two-person partnership, either partner has authority to
102. By the same token, minority/minority status is not material to the text's defense of the Donahue
outcome. Under a team-production approach, Mrs. Donahue should benefit from heightened fiduciary duties
even if she were the 51% owner of the firm.
103: 1 do not contend, of course, that minority/majority concerns are irrelevant from a fiduciary duty
perspective. On the contrary, there are a number of contexts, such as corporate freeze-outs and non-pro rata
disbursements, in which minority shareholders are at substantial risk. See Rock & Wachter, supra note 51, at
921-24. However, from the specific standpoint of monitoring-effort tradeoffs, minority status appears to be
somewhat less important than whether a fiduciary beneficiary is also a team member.
104. See William Bratton, Game Theory and the Restoration of Honor to Corporate Law's Fiduciary Duty
ofLoyalty, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 140, 154 (Larry Mitchell ed., 1995).
105. See supra Part III.B.
106. 106 S.E.2d 692 (N.C. 1959).
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continue making purchases on behalf of the partnership with traditional trading
partners. 10 7 Applied to this example, a rule like that in National Biscuit might mandate
that if the parties had settled on a work-effort equilibrium in some initial period, the same
equilibrium would be applicable in the next period. Such coordination rules tend to play
themselves out best in dynamic settings, a consideration to which I now turn.
7. Repeat Play
Finally, it is important to recognize that the numerical example from the text
analyzes a static, one-shot game. Although some business relationships exhibit similarly
short durations, many persist over time, affording the opportunity for reputations and
norms to develop, forces that can act outside the confines of legal rules to transform
individual behavior. 10 8 How, then, would the example above present itself if the parties
similarly interacted on a dynamic basis?
Before attempting to answer this question, it is important to note that dynamic
concerns within game theory often pose more problems than they solve. Indeed, a repeatgame context usually exacerbates problems of multiple equilibria, thereby diminishing
even further game theory's predictive powers. Moreover, without a unified, predictive
theory of how reputations or norms develop (which, for the most part, does not yet
existl 0 9), there is little to placate the problem of nonfalsifiability.
Nevertheless, one can still conduct a meaningful discussion of what strategic norms
are possible (as opposed to probable) within a dynamic setting-a discussion that
produces some interesting results. 110 Perhaps the most straightforward consideration
concerns what happens when team production is repeated a fimite number of times. Such
contexts seem appropriate for many business organizations, such as joint ventures and
limited liability companies, whose presumptive life is often finite. Moreover, even for
many corporations, whose life is presumed infinite, the anticipated interactions of some
team-players may be finite.111 It turns out, both here and generally, that finite repetition
among rational players produces substantially the same equilibrium behavior as does a
static environment. Indeed, once the parties arrive at the "last" period of play, they would
behave as if it were a static game. Working backwards, then, during the second-to-last
period of the game, both players-predicting their endgame behavior-would realize that
any attempt to build a reputation for use in the last period would be futile, and they
therefore would resign themselves once again to behaving is if it were a static game. This
107. Id. at 695.
108. Bratton, supra note 104, at 155-58, offers an account of the duty of loyalty within a repeat-game
context, as a norm of trust and honor.
109. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MicH. L.
REV. 338, 354 (1997) (arguing that the "appropriate" theory of norms is heavily context-specific).
110. The burgeoning norms literature has attempted to characterize the plausibility of a posited norm using
many approaches, ranging from repeat play (which I employ here), to evolutionary behavior, to endogenous
preferences. See, e.g., Randal C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: A Generative Approach to the
Adoption of Norms, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1225 (1997) (reviewing the literature and exploring computer
simulations of evolutionary norms for a specific game).
I 11. Consider, for example, venture capitalists, who tend to retain control of an acquired firm for a short
(and often loosely pre-determined) period of time. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture
Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 243-46
(1998).
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inductive process ends up "unraveling" the game all the way back to the first period, so
that the best the players can accomplish in a finitely-repeated game is to play out a series
to
static equilibria. 1 12 As such, when the dynamic interaction of the players is limited
1 13
finite duration, the repeat-play variation has no appreciable effect on the analysis.
When rational players interact on an infinitely-repeated basis, however, new
equilibria sometimes emerge-equilibria which might fairly be interpreted as "norms" of
behavior (though not necessarily extra-legal onesl 14). The most interesting of such
equilibria typically prescribe that the players adopt a set of "cooperative" strategies that
would not constitute equilibria of a static game, repeating them indefinitely until a
verifiable signal indicates a defection by one/both of the players. Should such a signal
occur, the typical equilibrium would prescribe that the players revert to a "punishment
scheme," which most generally involves playing out a static equilibrium of the game
forever. If the players are sufficiently patient, and the punishment scheme sufficiently
unattractive, then the posited cooperative strategies will constitute a type of dynamic
norm.
Turning our attention to the example in the text, consider the effects of indefinite
interactions within the closely-held context analyzed in Part III.B. Perhaps the first
natural question to ask is whether infinitely-repeated play can support the most efficient
cooperative strategy profile: exclusive expenditure of productive effort by both parties in
each period (which would yield an expected per-round payoff of $32 for each individual).
Unfortunately, if the players have private information about their actions (as here), and if
they discount future payoffs at all, such an outcome is simply not sustainable. The
intuition for this argument is as follows. As noted above, in order to support a set of
cooperative strategies, it is necessary for the players to utilize some verifiable signal
about prior defections to trigger a subsequent punishment scheme. If both players always
exert effort, however, then neither can engage in the monitoring activity that would
provide such a signal directly. Consequently, to trigger any punishment scheme, either
(1) the parties would have to resort to an indirect signal of past shirking (such as a string
of unsuccessful outcomes for some finite number of rounds), or (2) they would have to
spend some fraction of their time monitoring each other.
Neither of these two approaches, it turns out, can sustain a fully-efficient dynamic
norm. The first-using indirect public signals-is particularly unavailing in this game, for

112. Interestingly, however, the necessity of repeating static equilibrium outcomes does not preclude the
choice of a different equilibrium in each period. Thus, for example, the players in a closely-held firm who are
subjected to a "weak" fiduciary law (Region 1)may be able to coordinate on a dynamic equilibrium prescribing
that they alternate playing the two asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria. Such a norm lead to a roughly fair
average division of the productive rents from the firm.
113. One caveat to this conclusion is the possible existence of so-called "irrational" behavior. If there exists
a small possibility each of the players has a habitual taste for working hard, then each party may have an
incentive to behave "as if' she were one of these players in the initial periods of a finitely-repeated game, in
order to cash in on that reputation in later periods. See David Kreps et al., Rational Cooperation in the Finitely
Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 245 (1982). In this particular context, however, such
behavior is even harder to support, since there is no perfectly-reliable signal as to whether a player expended
effort in the previous period.
114. As was illustrated above, the content of the underlying legal rule can profoundly affect the one-shot
game, which in turn can affect the feasible punishment schemes that enforce a dynamic norm of behavior. See
supra Part III.C.
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at least two reasons. First, because an unsuccessful outcome can always occur regardless
of the players' effort, such an approach would have the unappealing quality of eventually
invoking the punishment scheme even if neither party shirked. 115 But moreover, a noisy
proxy for past defections would not permit the identification of which player defected
from the norm; thus, the resultant punishment scheme would have to punish both players
symmetrically, further compromising its deterrent capacity. 116
The second approach-where some monitoring occurs in equilibrium-also falls short
of efficiency for an obvious reason: the players must spend some fraction of their time
engaging in non-productive activity. Nevertheless, this approach may be somewhat more
availing, in that it sometimes reveals the precise identity of a shirker. When such
identification is possible, it may be feasible to encourage a fair amount of effort by
threatening an ominous punishment for detected shirkers. In turn, this implies that ceteris
paribus, a cooperative norm is easiest to enforce when the consequence of defection is to
play out indefinitely the most unattractive one-shot equilibrium for a detected
deviator.11 7 As demonstrated above, the content of fiduciary duties (i.e., the value of 0)
plays a central role in determining the payoffs from such one-shot equilibria. 118
Accordingly, the enforcement of a cooperative dynamic norm hinges, in part, on
determining which of the feasible one-shot equilibria from Part ILI.B. exhibits the greatest
deterrent threat, maximally penalizing a shirker while minimally penalizing the more
119
diligent worker.

115. Recall from Table 1, supra, that even when both players work hard, the probability of a bad outcome
is still 20%. Thus, for example, if the punishment scheme were triggered by, say, low outcomes in two
consecutive periods, it is more than 10% likely that the punishment scheme will have begun by the end of the
fourth round.
116. See, e.g., DREW FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 193-96 (1991); Dilip Abreu et al.,
Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring, 58 ECONOMETRICA 1041 (1990)
(demonstrating that the admissible continuation strategies in such games to have a discontinuous "bang-bang"
property); Michihiro Kandori, The Use of Information in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring,59 REV.
ECON. STUD. 581 (1992) (demonstrating that the admissible set of payoffs are an increasing function of the
informativeness of each period's outcome); Roy Radner et al., An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game
with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria, 53 REV. ECON. STUD. 59 (1986) (also
demonstrating the general infeasability of first-best efficient norms in a similar context to that analyzed here).
117. By "easiest to enforce," I am referring the punishment scheme that will induce cooperation for the
largest range of potential discount rates. In general, game theory mandates that a punishment scheme will render
a cooperative norm enforceable only if players are sufficiently "patient" (i.e., their discount rates are sufficiently
low). Abreu et al., supra note 116, at 1053. Choosing the most unattractive punishment ensures the
enforceability of a cooperative norm for the highest possible degree of impatience.
118. See supra Part III.B.
119. See Abreu et al., supra note 116, at 1054-55 (demonstrating that the punishment strategy in such
games must be at the extreme values of the possible payoff set-in this case the point that minimizes the
deviator's payoff once detected).
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FIGURE 3: SUSTAINABLE PER-PERIOD PAYOFFS UNDER INFINITELY-REPEATED PLAY

To see how this reasoning plays out in the context of the instant example, consider
first a value of 0=1 within Region 3, corresponding to total disgorgement of a fiduciary's
payoffs. Recall that the unique one-shot equilibrium here was in mixed strategies, and
yielded an expected payoff of approximately $30 for each player. As suggested by the
above discussion, this static equilibrium-repeated indefinitely-does not represent a
particularly effective punishment scheme, since it is both relatively mild and it punishes
both players symmetrically. In fact, it turns out that it is impossible to support any
cooperative norm that outperforms a simple repetition of the one-shot equilibrium ad
infinitum. This impossibility is illustrated in Figure 3, which illustrates the per-period
expected payoffs that are sustainable under infinitely-repeated play. (The figure
presupposes throughout that players discount future payoffs at the rate of 5%). The
expected payoffs from the one-shot game in Region 3 are represented by point V, at
which each party receives an expected per-period payoff of $30. As it turns out, point V is
also the best per-period payoff one can accomplish through any infinitely-repeated norm.
In contrast, consider the effects of a small value of 0=0 within Region 1, which
supported three distinct one-shot equilibria. Importantly, unlike in other regions, here the
two asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria can constitute post-detection punishment
schemes. One could, for instance, require a detected shirker to assume the Sisyphean role
as the sole contributor of effort for every period thereafter. Moreover, such a scheme
would constitute an excellent deterrence device, since it gives detected deviators a payoff
of $27 and the non-deviator a payoff of $35 each period. (These respective payoffs are
represented by points X and Y in Figure 3). Here then, it turns out that it is possible to
support a dynamic norm at point Z, which improves on the static outcome by giving each
player an expected per period payoff of $31.40, an expected social gain of $0.80 over
either of the asymmetric equilibria in that Region. Clearly, such equilibrium payoffs
come much closer to first-best (falling $1.20 short) than do their attainable counterparts
in Region 3 (at Point V, which falls $4.00 short).

1999]

Taking the "I" out of "Team"

1033

Although this analysis is quite cursory, it holds at least two important lessons. First,
it strongly suggests that the content of the legal rule, by affecting the plausible equilibria
of a one-shot game, can indeed play an important role in determining the viability of
cooperative norms. Second, and probably more importantly, it implies that dynamic play
need not reverse the conclusions derived for the one-shot game, and in fact may
strengthen them.
IV. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

The central thesis of this Article-that fiduciary duties can impose unique strategic
costs on team members within closely held firms-is not simply a conceptual curiosity.
Indeed, a number implications for law logically flow from this observation. In this Part, I
will concentrate on two. First, the above analysis suggests that it may be advisable for
statutory business law to permit closely-held firms to "opt into" their most appropriate
fiduciary protections, and for courts to honor this choice. Second, if such statutory
permutations are inadvisable or infeasible, then judges, when adjudicating such cases
within closely-held fums, would be well-advised to take team-production considerations
into account.
A. Statutory Law
A principal lesson of the analysis above is that it is largely impossible for one to
diagnose, at least on a priori grounds, whether a randomly-selected firm will exhibit
greater deterrence or monitoring effects. Indeed, which effect dominates ultimately
comes down to a number of factors, such as deep pockets, non-team beneficiaries, and
the prospects for repeat play, which may or may not individually be satisfied within
different firms. If, however, the members of the productive team are themselves in a
position to diagnose their organizational characteristics ex ante, then it seems likely that
they would jointly prefer a governance structure that matches their organizational needs.
As such, their choice of legal status would, under the right conditions, constitute a signal
of their governance preferences. For instance, if Firm X begins productive operations
without invoking any statutory formalities, then one might interpret this action to reveal a
preference to be treated as a partnership, subject to strict fiduciary standards. If, on the
other hand, the participants in Firm X make the costly choice of incorporation, they might
signal a preference to be subjected to more lax fiduciary standards, similar to those of
public corporations. In many ways, this description is not too far from the way things
currently stand in most states.12 0
There are, however, some important caveats to this line of reasoning. Most
importantly, it presumes a credible integrity of both the strictness in fiduciary law among
partnerships and a reciprocal permissiveness for close corporations (at least as default
matters). Indeed, obligations of this sort are perhaps the most difficult and costly to
memorialize in a partnership agreement, corporate charter, or analogous document.
120. Indeed, as vestiges of the common law, partnerships may come into being in the absence of
any
formalities; but the formation of a corporation requires the performance of a fairly well-specified
set of
formalities (such as organizational meetings, board election, the drafting of by-laws, and stock issuance).
See
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 3, at 2-6.

1034

The Journalof CorporationLaw

[Summer

Without a notorious mechanism permitting such inexpensive ex ante self-selection, the
freedom to "contract out of the default rule" (to the extent that one exists) might represent
little more than a Pyrrhic victory. Significantly, as the overview in Part II illustrated, the
fiduciary contents of both partnership and close corporation law appear to be converging.
12 1
suggests that
On the one hand, the slackening of fiduciary standards within the RUPA
partnership law has been creeping (or perhaps racing) in the direction of contractual and
corporate principles. 122 Symmetrically, the increasing popularity of the "partnership
analogy"' 12 3 in close corporations law has given rise to considerable momentum in the
opposite direction. Should fiduciary duty law within these two statutory areas merge
completely, the relatively inexpensive ability to "opt into" an off-the-rack set of fiduciary
standards would likely be lost.
But even if the integrity between these two areas of law were to be maintained, two
significant problems remain. First, incorporation tends to send a "noisy" signal about
one's organizational needs. In addition to fiduciary concerns, such an act could reveal a
desire for (among other things) differing tax treatment, limited liability, or infinite
duration. 12 4 Constraining one's assessment to the binary choice between a general
partnership and a close corporation thus creates an indeterminacy about a firm's revealed
preferences. The increasing roles played by limited partnerships, LLCs, LLPs, and other
statutory permutations may help ease this signaling problem. But with fiduciary law in
125
it remains to be seen whether this
many of these areas still vastly underdeveloped,
helpful.
added heterogeneity will prove
Second, the self-selection argument presumes both that team members will be able
to identify their appropriate organizational characteristics ex ante, and that they will then
proceed to implement the value-maximizing outcome. Both of these presumptions may,
in some situations, be unfounded. Indeed, while the stylized "rational actor" is by
definition not prone to errors, business decisions within most contexts are made amid
profound risk and uncertainty-factors that have been long-known to generate cognitive
126
If the members of closely-held firms
pathologies in more "mortal" decision-makers.
form may reveal little
organizational
are often similarly afflicted, their decision about
team members could
if
even
Moreover,
about their preference for fiduciary obligations.
organizational form
of
choice
ultimate
recognize the appropriate structure ex ante, their
information, or
transaction,
If
significant
negotiation.
collective
may still be a product of
also constitute
may
outcome
the
bargain,
to
endeavors
coordination costs undermine their
127
signal.
a poor
121. See supranote 27 and accompanying text.
122. See Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J.
897.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 46-53.
124. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 3, at 237-38.
125. For instance, as noted in Part 11,the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, while allowing for an
LLC's certificate of formation to alter fiduciary duties, leaves unspecified the exact content of these duties. See
supra note 53. See also LARRY RIBSTIEN & PETER LETSOU, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS § 9.08[C] (1996) (noting

the dearth of judicial opinions in this area).
126. For a good review, see the symposium papers published in 51 VAND.L.REv. 1495 (1998).
127. For an example of just such bargaining failure, see Jason Johnston, Opting Out and Opting In:
Bargainingfor FiduciaryDuties in Corporate Ventures, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 291, 291-94 (1992) (arguing that if
the participants have private information ex ante about their abilities to act opportunistically, then they may
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Perhaps these limitations are significant enough-at least to some-to render the
self-selection argument untrustworthy. If so, then there may be an alternative mechanism
for taking team-production concerns into account: judges themselves.
B. Doctrine
Assuming (for argument's sake) that statutory self-selection is either unattractive or
infeasible, it may be possible to incorporate team-production concerns into a unitary
fiduciary law, but one animated by casuistry and fact-specific determinations. Indeed, by
paying close attention to organizational details, a judge may be able to diagnose whether
a closely-held firm is dominated by deterrence or monitoring effects. In particular, many
of the variations explored at the end of Part III help to suggest just what effects might be
important in making such a determination.
Consider, for instance, the existence of non-productive fiduciary beneficiaries, such
as silent partners or non-managerial shareholders. As noted above, 128 such individuals
need not sacrifice productive effort in order to monitor, and there may therefore be reason
to accord them stronger fiduciary rights than their productive counterparts. It may be
possible, then, for a court to account for team-production concerns by determining
whether the instant plaintiff is also a member of the productive team, and selecting the
appropriate standard accordingly. Such an approach, moreover, may also be of assistance
in distinguishing a number of cases that seem to cut against the distinctions often asserted
between partnerships and incorporated entities. For example, the recent Texas case of
Bohatch v. Butler & Binion12 9 took a rather weak stand on fiduciary duties when it
refused to extend protection to a partner in a law-firm who was expelled for attempting to
expose alleged practices of over-billing by one of her colleagues. Finding that whistleblowing retaliation did not constitute an "improper purpose" for invoking the expulsion
provision in the partnership agreement, the court held that a partner could be expelled for
"purely business reasons" without violating fiduciary duties. In contrast to Bohatch is
the
well-known Massachusetts case of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype,130 which employed a
partnership analogy to impose a strict fiduciary duty within a close corporation.
Specifically, Donahue held that the managers of a close corporation violated their
fiduciary duties to a shareholder when they refused to extend the same attractive buy-out
terms to her that they had to the former manager (who was their father) upon his
31
retirement. 1
Side-by-side, Bohatch and Donohue seem to articulate not only differing outcomes,
but also divergent conceptions of fiduciary law. Moreover, these competing conceptions
seem vaguely counter-intuitive, given that it was the partnership case that pronounced
the weaker form of legal obligation. Nevertheless, if one takes into account the
productive roles of the two respective plaintiffs, the outcomes (and the analyses) appear

behave strategically in bargaining, and the optimal form of fiduciary duties will not emerge). See also
Thompson, supra note 2, at 699-702 (arguing that minority shareholders may not recognize the dangers of
down-stream opportunism when entering the relationship).
128. See supra text accompanying notes 99-101.
129. 977 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1998).
130. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975) (discussed supra note 99).
131. Id. at 511.
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more justifiable. Indeed, Donahue involved a plaintiff who played absolutely no
productive role at the firm, having come into her ownership stake from her late spouse, a
132
Bohatch, in contrast, involved a beneficiary who
former productive team member.
simultaneously engaged in productive activities at the firm, and she was in fact one of
only three attorneys in the branch office where she worked. Moreover, it appears that the
majority in Bohatch was not only aware of the potential problems with team-production
concerns, but they predicated much of their opinion exclusively on the dangers presented
by intra-team conflict:
We are sensitive to the concern expressed by the dissenting Justices
that "retaliation against a partner who tries in good faith to correct or
report perceived misconduct virtually assures that others will not take
these appropriate steps in the future." However, the dissenting Justices
do not explain how the trust relationship necessary both for the firm's
existence and for representing clients can survive such serious
accusations by one partner against another. The threat of tort liability
for expulsion would tend to force partners to remain in untenable
circumstance-suspicious of and angry with each other-to their own
detriment and that of their clients whose133matters are neglected by
lawyers distractedwith intra-firmfrictions.
This passage almost certainly reflects a general, intuitive understanding of the
governance problems presented when a firm's fiduciaries wear the dual hats of producer
and monitor. It is a doctrinal development that is perfectly consistent with (and indeed
suggested by) the analysis set forth in Part 111.134
Just as in the non-productive beneficiary .case, it may be possible for courts to use
other factual premises in diagnosing fiduciary disputes within closely-held firms. As
noted in Part III, the existence of deep pockets, the prevalence of severe free riding
problems, and the history and future likelihood of repeat play might all constitute
components of a unified fiduciary duty doctrine applied on a case-by-case basis.
already garnered a fair amount
Moreover, such an approach to fiduciary duty doctrine has
135
academy.
the
within
and
judges
of support, both among
Judge-made law, of course, is not without its own hazards. Most notably, ex post
adjudication comes at a cost of greater litigation costs expended by the parties. Moreover,
132. Id.at5lOn.8.
133. Bohatch, 977 S.W.2d at 547 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
134. To be sure, Bohatch involved other factors that might have cut the other way, even within a strict
efficiency analysis. For example, Butler & Binion's clients might have preferred the maintenance of strong
whistle-blowing incentives if the costs of intra-firm monitoring could be recaptured by clients in the form of
better legal representation or fee rebates. Nonetheless, this argument does not negate the existence of intra-team
monitoring costs as an important factor worthy of consideration.
135. See, e.g., Michaels v. Michaels, 767 F.2d 1185, 1196-97 (7th Cir. 1985) (using a standardized
objective doctrine to measure materiality of non-disclosures to shareholders, but advocating case-by-case
tailoring of such standards); Toner v. Baltimore Envelope Co., 498 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. App. 1990) (also
advocating a single, tailored framework); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 4, at 244 (citing Michaels

approvingly, and noting the versatility of such an approach); DeMott, supra note 122, at 910 (arguing that the
concept of fiduciary obligation "is inevitably tied to the particular context in which it arises").
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the outcomes meted out by courts may be difficult to predict from the merits of the case
and therefore highly uncertain. 13 6 In addition, it is not obvious that judges will always be
able to identify the facts relevant to team-production considerations. If such problems are
sufficiently severe, it may be better to opt for statutory self-selection (notwithstanding its
own apparent shortcomings). Such objections, however, while worthy of consideration,
do not absolve us from requiring that someone-be it judges (acting ex post), the parties
themselves (acting ex ante), or perhaps legislatures (seemingly always acting)-make
these often important decisions. Moreover, it appears from the above discussion that
judges already are doing so in some cases, 137 and probably cannot avoid having more of
them land in their collective laps. Finally, absolute ex post judicial accuracy is often
unnecessary to induce efficient upstream behavior, particularly if courts tend to get it
right on average. 138 Consequently, the utility of intra-firm monitoring concerns for legal
doctrine is difficult to ignore.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Few concepts within business law have proven to be as simultaneously thoughtprovoking and frustrating as fiduciary obligations. Readily lending themselves to
numerous positive and normative accounts, fiduciary duties lie at the core of most of the
interesting and intractable debates within both case law and the organizational
governance literature. This Article has attempted to contribute to those debates (and
perhaps even problematize them). Focusing on the role of intra-firm monitoring costs
within productive teams, I have argued that strict fiduciary duties in closely-held firms
may have profound and unexpected effects, which in turn can undermine the putative
purposes of such obligations. To be sure, I have focused predominantly on one such
phenomenon, and other attempts may reveal even more important insights than those
heralded here. 139 Be that as it may, the analysis above suggests that team-production
concerns hold important implications for fiduciary law-lessons that deserve to be kept
(to borrow a familiar refrain) at a higher level than that trodden by the crowd.

136. See, e.g., Franklin Gevurtz, California'sNew Limited Liability Company Act: A Look at the Good, the
Bad, and the Ambiguous, 27 PAC. L.J. 261, 288 (1996) (noting that judicial intervention is subject to
considerable arbitrariness); Larry Ribstein, The Closely Held Firm: A View from the United States, 19 MELB. U.
L. REV. 950, 955 (1994) (arguing that such remedies create "a potential judicial 'wild card').
137. See supra text accompanying notes 129-133.
138. See Mahoney, supra note 2; cf Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal
Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1072-82 (1995) (demonstrating that judicial
inaccuracy may actually mitigate strategic concerns by channeling parties into efficient interim bargaining
behavior such as renegotiation and settlement).
139. For example, the analysis above might have interesting applications if one introduced exit options on
top of fiduciary duties. Mahoney, for example, supra note 2, at 16-2 1, conjectures that the apparent infrequency
of contractual exit options in close corporations may be due to protections afforded by strong fiduciary duties. If
such strong fiduciary duties impose costly incentives to monitor, however, then exit options might be a better
mechanism for protecting minority interests.

